Rhetorical Pragmatics

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ABSTRACT

This study tackles Rhetorical Pragmatics. It starts with a brief idea about Rhetoric; its relationship with Dialectics, Communication, and pragmatics. The study adopts Leech's model of communication which entails explaining the Interpersonal Rhetoric with its components: the cooperative , politeness, irony and Banter principles. An idea concerning the textual Rhetoric is also presented in section four giving some significant points on its principles. The paper also deals with Rhetorical Pragmatic Strategies, types of arguments, figures of speech and Tropes. The paper ends with a brief idea about Strategic Maneuvering in argumentation.

Keywords: Rhetoric, Pragmatics, argument, argumentation, cooperative principle, tropes and strategic maneuvering.

1. Rhetoric

1.1 Historical Background

Rhetoric has its roots in the culture of Greece and Rome as a system of persuasive techniques. Rhetoric is defined as "the ability to see, in any given case, the available means of persuasion". Rhetoric is the persuasive use of language. This discipline flourished by the appearance of Aristotle's Rhetoric in the 4th century (BC.) by the work of the famous Roman teachers of rhetoric such as Cicero and Quintilian.

Aristotle made a distinction between three main modes of persuasion:

(a) Appeal by reason

(b) Appeal by ethics

(c) Emotional (aesthetical) appeal.

This distinction is mirrored in the three-fold division of styles:

1- Logos: persuasion through reasoning. (The use of logical arguments)

2- Ethos: persuasion through personality and stance. (speaker as truthful, reliable, trustful & worthy person)

3- Pathos: persuasion through the arousal of emotion. (in the audience)

(See sections: 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 below)

Arabs were also inspired by this art.Their rhetoric began by the publication of Al-Jirjani's famous books; (**اسرار البلاغة Asrar-al-Balagha)** "The Secrets of Rhetoric" and (**دلائل الاعجاز - Dla'il** al-**I'jaz)** "Miraculous Evidences". Al-Sakkaki also is celebrated for his role in organizing Arabic rhetoric .

Arab rhetoricians divide بلاغة into three parts: علم البديع , علم البيان , علم المعاني.

(For more detail see: Ramadan, 2003; Al-Qizweeni, 739/2000; Al-Atheer, 637/1984; Abu Ali, 1999).

Currently, rhetoric is developing once more. Leech (1983: 15) illuminates that the significance of rhetoric lies in the focus it places on a goal oriented situation, in which speaker (s) uses the language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of hearer (h). Leech follows Halliday in classifying rhetoric into INTERPERSONAL and TEXTUAL rhetorics. Each consists of principles, such as the cooperative principle (CP) and the politeness principle (PP). These principles, in turn, consists of a set of maxims and sub-maxims (See figure (2) below). Rhetoric is an argument designed to persuade a specific audience. In other words, it (i.e., Rhetoric) is the study of persuasion. It uses language in such a way to attract people and change their decisions through both argumentative appeals (See sec. 5.2 below) and rhetorical figures of speech (See sec. 5.3 below) (Dave, 2008[my emphasis]). Kennedy (2007) considers rhetoric as "the energy inherent in emotion and thought transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions or actions. When we express emotions and thoughts to other people with the goal of influencing (persuading) them, we are engaged in rhetoric." Persuasion is defined by Lakoff (1982) as the nonreciprocal attempt or intention of one party to change the behavior, feelings, intentions, or viewpoint of another by communicative means. Persuasion is recognized as a directive speech act in which the speaker's purpose is to get the hearer to commit him/herself to some course of action. In other words, persuasion is an attempt to make the world match the words. It is quite difficult to "marry" such an ancient discipline as rhetoric with such a new discipline as pragmatics, if we do not put both in the same "register level", i.e. in the level of intentionality.

1.2 Pragmatics and communicative Intentions

Pragmatics has mainly focused on the communicative use of language conceived as intentional human action. Communicative intentions mean that: "A intended the utterance of X to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention". (Grice, 1957/1989: 220.) Communicative intentions are intentions to produce some response on the part of the addressee. It seems that what the speaker usually intends by his or her communicative action is to change the mental states of the addressee. The intention of the speaker when a speaker says, for instance, '*It is raining*' could be to induce the addressee to believe that it is raining. Much of the work in current Pragmatics views linguistic understanding as the process of recognition of the speaker's communicative intentions. The addressee relies on linguistic and extralinguistic information for reaching that recognition. The perlocutionary effects on the audience, intended or not intended by the speaker, are usually ignored by pragmatic studies. This is where Rhetoric can make its contribution. Persuasive as well as convincing and other kinds of perlocutionary intentions are taken to constitute the basis of rhetorical studies of linguistic use.

1.3 Rhetoric and Dialectic

Some earliest scholars, such as Aristotle think that rhetoric and dialectic are synonymous. In fact this is not the case because there are fundamental differences between the two fields in what they do and how they do it. One basic difference between the two is that dialectic has two participants taking turns; the proponent makes a move and then the respondent makes a move responding to a prior one. Dialectic always takes as its framework of an argument a connected sequence of moves. Rhetoric, on the other hand, does not appear to fit in this model. In the rhetorical argument, Ss / Ws are seen as making a presentation to Hs/Rs without expecting mutual communications (Walton, 2007:17 [underlined items are mine]). Another difference is that dialectic proceeds by question and answer in a logical sequence while rhetoric uses continuous exposition by all means of persuasion. The differences between rhetoric and dialectic can be summarized in the following table:

Table (1) Differences between Rhetoric and Dialectic

Rhetoric	Dialectic
One participant	Two participants
One-way communication	Two-way communication
All means of persuasion	Question and answer moves

Adopted from Al-Tamimi (2011: 37)

1.4 **Rhetoric and Communication**

Rhetoric does not appear to fit two participants taking turns, rather Ss / Ws are seen as making a presentation to Hs/Rs without expecting mutual communications (Walton, 2007: 17). Rhetoric does not proceed by question and answer in a logical sequence but it uses continuous exposition by all means of persuasion. One-way communication is designed more to manipulate (influence) than to inform (Smith, 2002). The classification of language with respect to communication technologies in terms of one-way versus two-way communication leads to four possibilities which are introduced in the table below:

Table (2) Communication Possibilities

Communicative Way	*Examples*
Two-way non-mediated communication	face-to-face conversation
Two-way mediated communication	telephone, email
One-way non-mediated communication	Lecture
One-way mediated communication	print, radio, internet, ads

(After Fairclough, 2003:77)

Rhetoric is preferably employed when there is no chance of mutual communication and information exchange.

1.5 Rhetorical Pragmatics

The most striking difference between Rhetoric and Pragmatics is the fact that Pragmatics is typically **descriptive** while Rhetoric is **prescriptive***. The most important similarity between Rhetoric and Pragmatics is, of course, the focus on the use and function of language and the role of language in different activities. Also, both disciplines try to give account for non-explicit or non-verbal information in discourse, such as implicatures and gestures respectively. Speech act theory considers some of the main functions of rhetoric under the label of perlocutionary speech acts, e.g. convince, judge and defend. It seems reasonable to say that pragmatics has a wider coverage than, and subsumes the subject matter of rhetoric (Larsson, 1998: 9). The concept of rhetorical pragmatics is referred to by Walton (2004:21) as the use of a proposition to carry out a goal in an argument **or** to make the language very effective within a particular context as through the use of figures of speech. One common and important type of goal is to successfully convince or persuade a respondent. The relationship between pragmatics and rhetoric is deeply rooted, since the time of Aristotle, the discipline of rhetoric has been the primary repository (store) of thinking about persuasion. Booth (2004:31) indicates that the central concern of rhetoric is how to discover the most effective language to express a thought in a given situation, and then to alter its expressions to suit different situations. This makes rhetoric fall within the scope of pragmatics [as stressed above] because, as Sadock (2006:318) asserts, the suitability of language within a particular situation regarding various contextual factors is the main area of pragmatics. In this regard, many linguistic choices (strategies) are available in rhetoric to communicate thoughts ranging from explicit to implicit and from argumentative to figurative strategies.

Walton (2007:18) argues that Ss/Ws resort to rhetoric to consider;

(1) how to produce reasonable emotion in an audience (pathos), how to manifest a trustworthy character (ethos), and how to give the available facts and arguments (logos); and

(2) the linguistic options of using metaphor and irony, for instance, to ornament the language and attract the attention of Rs/Hs.

The relationship of rhetoric, argument and persuasion in rhetorical pragmatics can be shown in the following figure:

Figure (1) the relationship of rhetoric, argument and persuasion in rhetorical pragmatics



Adopted from Walton (2007: 18)

2. Leech's Model of Communication

Leech (1983: 56-59) adopts Halliday's concept of the functions of language, but treats them differently. Halliday (1973) proposes three functions of language, and treats them as being intrinsic to grammar. The three functions are presented below:

The ideational function: language functions as a means of conveying and interpreting experience of the world.

The interpersonal function: language functions as an expression of one's attitudes and an influence upon the attitudes and behavior of the hearer.

The textual function: language functions as a means of constructing a text, such as the spoken or written realization of language.

Leech interprets the ideational function as grammar (such as phonology, semantics, and syntax), but the interpersonal and the textual functions as pragmatics. Leech states that the interpersonal rhetoric and the textual rhetoric are characterized as "input constraints" and the "output constraints" of grammar respectively in the speaker's point of view of encoding process, while in the hearer's point of view, the textual rhetoric constrains the input, and the interpersonal rhetoric constrains the output in the decoding process. To show how the linguistic communication is realized in a means-ends analysis, Leech proposes a diagram in



(**Leech's(1983: 59) Model of Communication**)

which Halliday's three functions of language form hierarchy of components.

The figure above indicates that the discourse is by means of the message, which is by means of the text. The communication is successful when the speaker's intended proposition or illocutionary force in state 1 is understood by the hearer in state 6. To achieve this goal, the speaker needs to transfer his interpersonal rhetoric into a message (state 1 to 2) which is encoded into the text (state 2 to 3). This process imposes the speaker's ability of grammar, i.e. phonology, semantics, and syntax, to transfer a thought into the physical form of language. The hearer who receives the text (state 3 to 4) starts to interpret it in the opposite process of decoding which goes from the state 4 to 5 to 6.

(For more details on how the Textual Rhetoric fits into the total communicative process, see Leech, 1983: 59ff)

3. Interpersonal and Textual Rhetoric

Leech, on a survey of the interpersonal rhetoric, distinguishes two rhetorics, the interpersonal and the textual rhetorics (Leech, 1983), as shown in figure 2 below:



Figure (2) Leech's (1983) Interpersonal Rhetoric and Textual Rhetoric

3.1 The Interpersonal Rhetoric

3.1.1 The Interpersonal Role of the Cooperative Principle

Grice (1975) is famous for having discovered the "Cooperative Principle".*(See Grice , 1983 for more elaboration on Grice's Maxim)* Leech (1983) expanded the scope of Grice's CP by making endeavors to explain the operation of social rationale in communication. Lakoff's "Rules of Politeness" (1973) puts forward two major rules about the notion of politeness: be clear and be polite. Lakoff (ibid.) suggested that there are three rules for speakers to follow:

1) don't impose

2) give options
3) make the addressee feel good - be friendly Leech (1983) goes a step further beyond these simple suggestions and developed his theory by adding the Politeness Principle (PP), to emphasize the idea that "politeness is an important missing link between the Gricean CP and the problem of how to relate sense to force" (Leech, 1983: 79).

3.1.2 The Interpersonal Role of the Politeness Principle

Leech (1983) brings pragmatics and rhetoric together. According to Leech (ibid.: 16) cooperation and politeness are required as regulative factors for preserving the fruitful path of the conversation that is realized. Hence, he
(ibid.: 17) places these important pragmatic notions (i.e. Cooperative Principle CP and Politeness Principle PP) with rhetorical principle of irony and principle of interest within a more general framework of Interpersonal Rhetoric. *(For more elaboration the reader may make a recourse for Leech's six maxims in Leech, 1983: 131-9, chapter 6)*

3.1.3 The Interpersonal Role of the Irony Principle

Leech (1983: 102, 142) proposes the Irony Principle (IP) as a higher-order principle. According to Leech, the CP and the PP have direct role in promoting effective interpersonal communication whereas the IP is parasitic (depending on, clinging) on the CP and the PP and its function can only be explained in terms of other principles. In Leech's view, the IP "enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming to be polite" (Leech. 1983: 142).
The speaker performs irony by insincere politeness. The insincerity may take the form of a breach of the maxim of Quantity or more often a breach of the maxim of Quality.

Example (1): That's all I wanted !
Example (2): Bill wanted that news like he *wanted a hole in the head*.
(Leech. 1983.142)

These two examples are non-observance of the maxim of Quality, used ironically, example (1) means "That's exactly what I did not want," In example (2), the insincerity of the speaker's opinion is clear from the absurdity. Leech observes that when performing an irony, "speaker appears to make an innocent assumption which is observably untrue, and by that means implicates that the opposite assumption, which is impolite, is true." (Leech, 1983: .143) The IP provides a method of avoiding direct criticism, insults, threats, etc.

3.1.4 The Banter Principle

According to Leech, irony is an apparently friendly way of being offensive, while **banter** is an offensive way of being friendly. Leech's Banter Principle is expressed as follows:
In order to show solidarity with the hearer, say something which is
(i) fit obviously untrue, and
(ii) obviously impolite to the hearer.

The implicature derived from the Banter Principle is: "What the speaker says is impolite to the hearer and is clearly untrue. Therefore what the speaker really means is polite to the hearer and true." (Leech, 1983: 144).

Banter often appears in casual linguistic conversation, particularly among young people. For instance, in a chess game, one person may say jokingly to another:
"What a mean, cowardly trick!" referring to a particular clever gambit (ploy, strategy, maneuver), Or two friends may greet each other with remarks like:
"Here comes trouble!" or
"Look what the cat's brought in !"
The Banter Principle is based on the fact that the more intimate the participants are, the less polite they seem to be. Hence lack of politeness can become a sign of intimacy and the participants may establish and maintain such a close relationship by bantering.

3.2 The Textual Rhetoric

The textual pragmatics has been chiefly illustrated by the Maxim of End-focus. Slobin (1975) has proposed a scheme for the Textual Rhetoric in which there is a set of four principles, and each principle can be subdivided into maxims. The four principles are:

1- Be humanly processible in ongoing time;
2- Be clear;
3- Be quick and easy;
4- Be expressive.

Slobin argues that these precepts are observed by languages themselves, rather than by the users of languages. Thus, under conditions of change, languages will always tend to change in directions which preserve these principles.
Slobin presents that these principles are actually at work in languages themselves: such arguments are consonant (in line) with the case for regarding grammars as being under the functional influence of pragmatics. However, Slobin's principles should be labeled, according to Leech (1983: 65-67) as follows:

3.2.1 The Processibility Principle

This principle recommends that the text should be presented in a manner which makes it easy for the hearer to decode in time. There are three types of decisions which are interrelated:
(a) how to segment the message into units;
(b) how to assign degrees of prominence or subordination to different parts of the message; and
(c) how to order the parts of the message.

For example:

That Simon will resign *is on the cards.*

It is on the cards **that Simon will resign.**

Many movement transformations **(e.g.,** the rule of extraposition) serve what is called the

Maxim of End-weight by helping to ensure that complex
constituents are placed at the end of a clause or sentence (Leech, 1983: 65).

3.2.2 The Clarity Principle

The Clarity Principle applies to different levels of coding, but in general it may be broken down into two maxims, (a) a Transparency Maxim, and (b) an Ambiguity Maxim:

(a) Retain a direct and transparent relationship between semantic and phonological structure ***(i.e.*** between message and text). (b) Avoid ambiguity.

For instance:

The morning came at last **when we were due to leave.**

The separation of the modifying clause- **when we were due to leave** from its head **morning** obscures the relationship between argument and predicate. The requirement to avoid ambiguity is closely connected with transparency, but it can be important in its own right (See Leech, 1983: 66-7).

3.2.3 The Economy Principle

The Economy Principle means 'Be quick and easy'. If one can shorten the text while keeping the message unimpaired, this reduces the amount of time and effort involved both in encoding and in decoding.

On the phonological level, for example, economy favours elisions, assimilations, and other abbreviating and simplifying processes. Similarly, on the syntactic level, the Economy Principle has a contributory Maxim of Reduction which might be simply enunciated as 'Reduce where possible'. But reduction should not be recommended where it leads to ambiguity. The processes which are subsumed under the heading of 'reduction' here are

(a) pronominalization,

(b) substitution by other pro-forms, e.g.: do, so,.. etc.

(c) ellipsis (or deletion). (Leech, ibid.)

For example, the following sentence is an example of injudicious (inadvisable) pronominalization: in order to avoid ambiguity in this case, S would have to sacrifice economy by repeating the noun milk, e.g.,

-If the baby won't drink cold milk, ***the milk*** should be boiled.

(ibid.)

The pragmatic point about reduction is that it abbreviates the text, and often simplifies its structure, while maintaining the re-coverability of the message. It is when, for some reason, the message's recoverability is impaired that reduction comes into conflict with the Clarity Principle.

3.2.4 The Expressivity Principle

With the Expressivity Principle, we are concerned with effectiveness which includes expressive and aesthetic aspects of communication, rather than simply with efficiency. For example, an Iconicity Maxim (which invites the user, all other things being equal, to make the text imitate aspects of the message) should be included in it (Leech, ibid.: 68), (See also: Bolinger, 1980: Ch. 3; Leech and Short, 1981: 233-42). We may note the influence of the Expressivity Principle in inhibiting reduction:

- John Brown was guilty of the crime, and John Brown would have to pay for it.
- They put in the best they had' and we put in the best we had and we beat them and beat them bad.
- She saw there an object. That object was the gallows. She was afraid of the gallows (= scaffold, gibbet).

In each of these examples, it would be possible to abbreviate the text without causing-ambiguity. The fact that the Economy Principle does not operate, although it is not inhibited by ambiguity, suggests that some other principle is in play. We can reasonably argue that these examples are cases of expressive repetition, where the emphasis of repetition has some rhetorical value such as surprising, impressing, or rousing (= inspiring) the interest of the addressee. Thus, the repetition of *John Brown* seems to carry the implicature: 'John Brown and no one other than John Brown would have to pay for it.'

4. Rhetorical Pragmatic Strategies

Rhetorical pragmatic strategies include argumentation appeals and pragmatic figures of speech. Rhetorical pragmatic strategies are powerful tools because of the deviation that characterizes rhetorical means combined with pragmatic devices.

4.1 Rhetoric, Argument and Argumentation

The relationship between rhetoric and argument can be seen through their aim of persuasion. An argument, as O'Keefe (1977: 121-8) puts it, has two senses. The first "refers to a kind of utterance or a sort of communicative act". To put it in a simpler way, an argument is something that **a person makes (or presents** or **utters).** Commands, apologies, promises, etc., are all instances of argument. By contrast, the other sense of argument "refers to a particular kind of interaction". It is something that **people have** or **engage in),** as in bull sessions, quarrels, discussions, etc.

4.1.1 Pragmatic Reasoning of Argument

An argument is the use of language for specific reasons, as to persuade or attract (Walton, 2004:5), and classified under the study of rhetorical pragmatics. The term "argument" is differentiated by Walton (2006:2) from "argumentation" in that the latter is a broad concept that denotes a dynamic process of connecting arguments together in a dialogue. It includes many arguments and participants in a dispute. There are two types of arguments: monological and dialogical (Besnard and Hunter, 2008:10). The former is the construction of S's/W's argument for and against a particular conclusion (claim). It is a reasoned process of one-way-communication viewed as an internal process for S/W with perhaps a tangible output (e.g., sentence, article, etc.) intended to persuade. In this type of arguments, there is no

representation of a dialogue between agents or entities. The latter is a set of Ss/Ws or entities that interact to construct an argument for and against a particular claim.
If Ss/Ws offer an argument, one or more of the other agents may dispute the argument (Cf. Holmes, 2005:81).
Besnard and Hunter (2008:11) introduce some examples of monological arguments and the kinds of agents or entities that are responsible for producing them:
A newspaper article by a journalist.
A political speech by a politician.
A magazine advertisement by an advertiser.
All monological arguments are either one-to-many argument or auto- argument. One-to-many argument is the one that distributed by S/W or entity for otherHs/ Rs or entities, as in, a magazine ad by an advertiser, a lecture by a scientist, or a speech by a politician. Auto-argument, on the other hand, is done by S/W identifying key arguments and counterarguments for their own use, such as for problem analysis prior to making a decision. **For example, when someone buys a house s/he has a limited budget, a list of features s/he likes, and a list of features s/he dislikes**. It is not directed toward specific

Hs/Rs or entities (ibid.). The following figure summarizes the aforementioned argument types in relation to the communicative form discussed above:



Figure (3) Represents Argument Types in Relation to the Communicative Form (After Al-Tamimi, 2011)

Two important differences between the monological and dialogical arguments are needed to be explained here. First, the dialogical argument, according to Eemeren et al. (2009:2), proceeds or succeeds by refuting and justifying a proposition between a protagonist and an antagonist. By contrast, for the monological argument, where no antagonistic answer is expected, an appeal to pathos, ethos or logos is the key notion of the proceeding or success of the argument. Second, the structure of the dialogical argument includes four stages(1): Confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, concluding stage , while it includes a one-stage in the monological argument.

(1)*See Walton (2006: 299) and Van Eemeren (2009:47) for more details on the four stages of the dialogical argument.*

4.1.2 Pragmatic Structures of Argument

Toulmin's (2003:87) model identifies the content of the argument as made by one stage direction, viz., not confronting to four stages argument. His (ibid.) structure of the argument is pragmatic in the sense that: (a) what determines the structure is the situation in which Ss/Ws, propositions, and context do work together; (b) the propositions support one another in their content but not in their syntactic structure; (c) the structure may contain only one proposition supported by other propositions that could be implicit and inferred from the context. He (ibid.) recognizes three primary premises or propositions of the pragmatic structure of the argument. They are data, warrants, and claims. He (ibid.) explains them as follows:

Data (grounds) are facts appealed to as a foundation for the claim. They are the "fact" or subject matter on which the argument is based. They may include the proof of expertise, statistics, authorities, etc. For example:

- Over 70% of all people over 65 years have a hearing difficulty.

Warrants are inferences that link data to the claim. Rs/Hs depend on the warrant to believe or react to the conclusion. Warrants may be explicit or unspoken and implicit. They answer the question "Why should we believe or react to the claim?" For example:

- *A hearing aid helps most people to hear better.*

Claims (conclusions) are propositions Ss/Ws ask other people to accept and respond to. They include arguing information to be believed as true or actions to be reacted to. For example:

-*You should use a hearing aid.*

Toulmin's (2003:87) model can be diagrammed as follows:



Figure (4) Propositions of the Pragmatic Structure of the Argument. (After Toulmin, 2003: 87)

The pragmatic structure of data, warrant and claim is not obligatory. It may include one or two propositions depending on the way Ss/ Ws want to present their arguments. Walton (2004:142) expands on Toulmin's model by adding the notions syllogism and enthymeme.

4.1.2.1 Syllogism

The complete pragmatic structure of data, warrant, and claim represents a structure of an argument Walton (2004:146) calls the deductive argument or "Syllogism". He (ibid.) states that a syllogism is an argument in which the three propositions are spelled out. The data and warrant provide a guarantee for the truth of the claim. For example:

All xs are y, and

Z is an x,

Therefore, z is a y.
-All plants are living things.
All trees are plants.
Therefore, all trees are living things.

Walton's (2004:106) syllogistic argument includes the three propositions of Toulmin's (203:87) model. But, once it misses a proposition (whether a datum or warrant), it would turn to be "enthymeme".

4.1.2.2 Enthymeme

The incomplete pragmatic structure of arguments is referred to as an inductive argument or "Enthymeme". An enthymeme is an argument: with (an) implicit proposition(s). In rhetorical reasoning, the enthymeme is a truncated syllogism in which one or two propositions are left out and assumed by Hs/Rs. It makes the logic harder to test because the whole argument is not spelled out . The structure of the enthymemic argument is either a single proposition (claim) or two propositions of claim plus data or warrant . For example:

1 - A sole claim argument:
-Save 20% (BBC Focus Magazine, 2011)

This is an enthymemic argument which includes a sole claim that requires Hs/Rs to respond and save 20% of their account.

2- A two-proposition argument of data and claim:
-Walking Festival Guide 2011
-Find the perfect walking festival near you.
(BBC Countryfile Magazine, 2011)

4.2 Argumentative Appeals (Rhetorical triangle)

4.2.1 Ethos

Ethos refers to the credibility or ability to carry out an argument. The ability to persuade is affected by the credibility of the document. Credibility is the degree to which a statement, a person, and/or a company is perceived to be ethical, trustworthy, and sincere. Credibility is strongly related to the audience's perception of how believable a speaker is (Boone and Kurtz, 1994).

4.2.2 Pathos

The term Pathos refers to as emotional appeal. Emotional appeals are intended to make listeners feel afraid, compassionate, proud, angry, shameful and reverent, or the like. So, the appeal to pathos is directed towards the emotions of the audience. In many situations, emotion remains the most powerful persuasive factor. Where logical arguments sometimes fail, emotions often have the power to motivate people to respond and act (Boone and Kurtz, 1994:42).

5.2.3 Logos

The third pragmatic strategy of the argument is the appeal to reason or the logical appeal (logos). It refers to the internal consistency of the message, the clarity of the claim, the logic of its reason and the effectiveness of its supporting evidence.

The appeals to reason that an orator might use do not violate the principles of strict logic; they are merely adaptations of logic. So, whereas 'the syllogism and induction' are the forms that reasoning takes in logic, 'the enthymeme and the example 'are the forms that reasoning takes in rhetoric' (Corbett, 1990).

4.3 Figures of Speech

Any proposition can be expressed in a variety of ways. One of these ways is the use of rhetorical figures of speech, such as metaphor, understatement, pun, etc. These rhetorical figures of speech deviate from the norm by flouting (a) maxim(s) of conversational interaction (Levinson, 1983: 110). There are two types of figures of speech: **Schemes**(1) and **Tropes**. A figure of speech in the schemata mode involves a deviation from the ordinary pattern or arrangement of words *(Schemata)*. It is a change in the standard word order or pattern. For example, repetition, ellipsis, etc. By contrast, a figure of speech in the tropic mode involves a deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of words. For example, pun, hyperbole, etc (MacQuarrie and Mick, 1996: 3).

(1)*Schemes will not be dealt with throughout this presentation as they are out of the scope of this presentation).*

4.4 Tropes (Rhetorical Devices)

A trope twist words away from their usual meanings or collocations. A trope refers to "language used in a figuration way for a rhetorical purpose". For example, Mark Antony's speech from Julius Caesar:

> Friends, Romans and Countrymen, *lend me your ears…*

The phrase "lend me your ears" is used figuratively for rhetorical ends, hence, it is a trope. It carries more powerful impact than “listen to me for a moment”, for instance. There are two kinds of tropes: **Destabilization** and **Substitution** tropes.

4.4.1 Destabilization Tropes

The rhetorical operations of destabilization is seen to involve the use of an expression whose meaning is indeterminate in its context. In a trope of destabilization one means more than is said, and relies on the recipient to develop the implications.

4.4.1.1 Metaphor

The rhetorical pragmatic strategy of metaphor depends on flouting the maxim of quality. It involves a comparison of two things X and Y, where X is totally identified with Y as if X is Y itself. This comparison between two different entities aims to arouse imaginative interpretation of one in the light of the other.

In metaphor the convention of truthfulness is deliberately violated. For example:

- **Computer is a brain.**

4.4.1.2 Simile

Simile is an explicit comparison (using “like” or “as”) between two things of unlike nature that yet have something in common (Cruse, 2006: 165).

- She walks *like* a proud peacock.

Harris et al (2005: 3) argue that metaphors and similes are structurally identical except for the presence of the explicit comparison markers such as 'like' and 'as'. Metaphors and similes also appear to be very similar in meaning.

- Her eyes were *like* diamonds.
- Her eyes were diamonds (ibid.: 3).

4.4.1.3 Irony

Irony is defined as a discrepancy between what a speaker says and what he or she believes to be true, as in the utterance “What a sunny day!” during a storm (Xiang Li, 2008: 5).

From a pragmatic perspective, irony is seen as sub-strategy of a broader category of indirect speech acts as well as conversational implicatures, on which it entirely relies (Attardo, 2001: 165).

To conclude, irony is a complex rhetorical pragmatic strategy, which engages speakers and hearers on various levels, if they appreciate it, they feel themselves to be part of the ‘in-group’ addressed, and are therefore not only entertained, but flattered. Consider the following exchange between two college students. This piece of conversation occurred in the students’ apartment, and focused on some ‘unwelcomed’ visitors who were staying with them at the invitation of another obnoxious(hateful=unwelcomed) roommate:

Anne: "By the way, were our *wonderful guests* still here when you came out and ate lunch?"

Dana: "I had a sandwich and ..."

Anne: "*Isn't it so nice to have guests here*?"

Dana: "Totally!"

Anne: "I just love it, you know, our housemates. They bring in *the most wonderful guests in the world* and they can totally relate to us."

Dana: "Yes, they do" (Gibbs and Colston, 2001: 189)



Figure (5): A Continuum of Some Rhetorical Tropes (After Mendoza and Peña, 2007)

4.4.1.4 Pun

A pun consists in the use of a word in two different meanings leading to two different interpretations of a statement. A pun is an ambiguity; specially, a fore-grounded lexical ambiguity. A pun is substitution based on accidental similarities. Pun can be divided into four terms, they are:

1.Pun (Homonym)

One word can be taken in two senses. For example:

- The right *contacts*,

-How to make a home *run*.

2.Pun (Antanaclasis)

Repeating a word in two different senses or repetition of the same word or form or sound but in different senses. For examples:

- Today's Slims at a very slim price, and Skin things that do

3.Pun (syllepsis)

A verb takes on a different sense as clauses it modifies unfold. For example:

-He drives a car fast, a bargain hard, and mower to distraction.

-Built to handle the years as well as the groceries.

4.Pun (resonant)

A phrase is given a different meaning by its juxtaposition with a picture. For example:

- Will bite when cornered [picture of car splashing up water as it makes a turn]

4.4.2 Substitution (Emphasis) Tropes

Tropes, such as overstatement and understatement, are intended to exercise emphatic effect on interlocutors; accordingly they are labelled as emphasis tropes (Harris, 2008: 5).

The rhetorical operations of substitution selects an expression that requires an adjustment by the message recipient in order to grasp the intended meaning. Within destabilization, the meaning may go different, while in substitution it sways in a scale. Types of substitution tropes include: **overstatement (hyperbole),** which refers to a case where the speaker's description is stronger than is warranted by the state of affairs described; **understatement** (**litotes)**, which refers to the converse of hyperbole and rhetorical questions **(strong/weak assertive force**).

4.4.2.1 Rhetorical Questions

A rhetorical question flouts the quality maxim and does not expect an answer. Pragmatically speaking, Rhetorical questions (henceforth RQ) have the illocutionary force of an assertion of the opposite polarity from what is apparently asked. That is, a positive RQ has the illocutionary force of a negative assertion, and a negative RQ has the illocutionary force of a positive assertion. Besides, RQs often generate conversational implicatures, and tend to involve the maxim of quality or manner so as to validate certain claim or persuade others of one's attitude or belief (Black, 2006: 26).

When a speaker wishes to assert that somebody, who is known to her audience and her, is a weird person, she may do so by benefiting from an RQ emphasis trope which implies a conversational implicature generated by means of flouting the maxim of quality, as illustrated in the following exchange:

A: John is a nice guy to hang with.

B: Right!! *Didn’t he behave mysteriously lately*??

B's utterance reads as “John is not the right person to hang with due to his enigmatic behaviour ".

4.4.2.2 Overstatement (Hyperbole)

Overstatement is the superordinate term which encompasses hyperbole and other phenomena related to amplification, excess, and superfluity (Ruiz, 2006: 791). In the present work hyperbole is employed to refer to overstatement.

Hyperbole is a form of extremity, an exaggeration that either magnifies or minimizes some real state of affairs. After metaphor, hyperbole is the most common trope (Sert, 2008: 3). It is a rhetorical pragmatic strategy which is considered by Leech (1983: 145) as a case where Ss/Ws description is stronger than the actual situation. It is detected from the flouting of the maxim of quality, for example:

- It made my blood boil. (Leech: ibid.)

Boiling is essentially assigned to water and other liquids but not to blood.

Hyperbole embraces intended exaggeration for pragmatic effect to increase impact on interlocutors, forming attitudes and opinions and even impressing the others' attitudes and opinions to certain persons.

4.4.2.3 Understatement (Litotes)

Understatement is a statement of quantity or intensity of something that is less than what its natural states are. It is the opposite of overstatement but similar in the flouting of the maxim of quantity (Cruse, 2006: 186). For instance,

- He was a little intoxicated.

When said of a man who has broken all the furniture.

An understatement is conspicuously less informative than some other statement. In other words, it is a by-product of flouting the maxims of quantity and quality.

Interlocutors are always more pleased to discover a thing greater than promised rather than less than promised. And it goes without saying that a person modest of his own talents wins his/her audience admiration more easily than an egotist or biased one. Alternatively, Harris (2008: 9) assures that understatement deliberately expresses an idea as less important than it actually is, either for ironic emphasis or for expressing politeness and tactfulness. In a more important way, understatement should be used as a tool for modesty and tactfulness. Consider the following:

- The girl next door is little bit naughty. (Gibbs and Colston, 2001: 5).

It seems that all the rhetorical tropes surveyed in this sub-section are of value to the process of expanding locutions. This value is derived from the power of persuasion they have on the one hand, and the pragmatic devices (CP maxims and PP maxims) they are combined with to form more complex pragma-rhetorical-strategies on the other hand. Eventually, these rhetorical principles (strategies) open the channels of communication but they do not provide the main motivation for talking.

It is Leech's Cooperation and Politeness principles that keep these channels of communication open.

5. Strategic Maneuvering

Strategic Maneuvering is described as advocates' attempts to make use of opportunities available in the dialectical situation for steering the discourse rhetorically in the direction that serves their own interests best (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2001: 151). There are two strategic maneuvers: 1.Maneuvers involving the same arguments

This strategic maneuver involves a contrast between gain-framed appeals (ones emphasizing the desirable aspects of compliance with the advocated view) and loss-framed appeals (ones emphasizing undesirable aspects of noncompliance). A gain-framed appeal emphasizes the advantages of adopting the communicator's recommended viewpoint; a loss-framed appeal emphasizes the disadvantages of not adopting the advocated view.

There are least five different maneuvers involving messages that offer the same argumentative considerations:

gain-loss appeal framing,

explicit versus implicit conclusions,

identified versus unidentified information sources,

complete versus incomplete (enthymematic) arguments, and

figurative versus literal expressions.

For example,

Television has harmful effects.

Television is poison.

The two messages advance the same underlying arguments, but where one message employs more literal language (e.g., "television has harmful effects"), the other uses a figurative expression (e.g., "television is poison").

2. Maneuvers involving the different arguments

By comparison, consider the contrast between one-sided and two-sided persuasive messages; and culturally-adapted versus unadapted value appeals.

A one-sided message offers only supporting arguments (that is, arguments supporting the advocated view); a two-sided message **both** presents supporting arguments and discusses opposing arguments. The contrast between one-sided and two-sided messages is thus a contrast that involves different arguments in the two messages.

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