



THE KURDISH ISSUE IN IRAQ AND THE BRITISH POLICY 1943-1945

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ABSTRACT

In the first days of the Barzan revolt, everything appeared perfect for the Kurds in Iraq. The Iraqi government negotiated with the Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani on their demands. The Iraqi government promised Kurds to solve their issue and give them their political and national rights within Iraq. These anticipation lived-short; sooner differences emerge between the Iraqi administration and the Kurdish leaders. The Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani saw no wish, however to seek struggle with the purpose of getting their national rights. In 1943, the first major breakout of war between the central government and the Kurds occurred. This fighting was keeping on with some interruptions until 1945. This paper will explore how the Iraqi governments and British authority in Iraq managed with the Kurdish issue. It examines the Iraqi government and British policies towards the Kurdish issue, which are logically and functionally related to Iraqi national policy, and the Kurdish relations with Iraqi governments. This study presented a significant amount of positively not published details about these parties. Particular attention is paid to link between Iraqi government also British policies and reaction to the Kurdish issue. This study is a historical research based on qualitative analyze of perspective from various actors. This study is used Kurdish and non-Kurdish sources.

Key words: the Kurdish issue and demands, Barzan revolt, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the British Kurdish policy and the Iraqi government national policy toward Kurds.

1.0 Introduction

In the Kurdish conflict with the governments of Iraq during the Second World War, no homogeneous position existed in either the Kurdish fighters or the Iraqi camp. The governments of Iraq were themselves divided on how to cope with the Iraqi Kurdish issue. It had maintained that the battle between the governments of Iraq and the Kurds came to split the ruling establishment into “Hawks”¹ who favored a military resolution and “peace-makers” shored up by the Kurdish intellectuals, advocating reform throughout the field of Kurdish diplomatic

¹ A politician who believes in using military forces.



relations². The lack of unison was more acute in the case of the Kurds. The old-fashioned leadership, which was tribal, preferred military forces, means to achieve Kurdish ambitions. Kurdish educated and intellectuals elements re-demonstrating the urban part of the Kurdish society, organized in political parties and associations or non-organized, advocated espoused cooperation with the government of Iraq³. The Kurdish individuals sought to appease the Kurdish areas and to redress the objection of the Kurds of Iraq by working through the government of Iraq. Conversely the Hawks prevailed both within the government of Iraq and among the Kurds⁴.

At the same time, the Kurdistan of Iraq comprised two centers of resistance against the central government in Baghdad, one in the Barzan province and the other in the city of Sulaimaniyya. The latter had been a center of revolutions against the Ottoman administrations previously to the formation of the country of Iraq. The existence of more than one main point of resistance led the United States of America (U.S.A) ambassador in Baghdad, for example, to state that the Kurds had “no leaders who appear arranged and capable to chief their people in an effective struggle for self-government within the state of Iraq or for establishing an independence state of Kurdistan”⁵. Certainly, a few Kurdish leaders did attain a definite degree of popularity among the Kurds of Iraq namely Mullah Mustafa Barzani (1903-1979) and Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinji (1878-1956)⁶. Yet neither had the capability to mobilize likewise unites the Kurds or chief a united Kurdish nationalist liberation movement. What is more, a competition existed between the Barzani leaders and Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinji above the power and socio-political status.

Due to the relatively weakened position of the British officials in Iraq in the early 1940s combined with the skyrocket political activities of diverse organization and the revolts of the 1920s, 1930s the first half of 1940s, the way was once more paved for disturbances in the Kurdistan of Iraq⁷. Furthermore, the deteriorations of the circumstances of the Kurdish people in Iraq were drastic, also even the British officials were aware of the failure of the monarchy government of Iraq to develop or to rationally cope with the circumstances. The deteriorations in environment were reflected in general dissatisfaction among the Kurds. The British officials in Baghdad illustrated the situation in the Kurdistan of Iraq as unsatisfactory. On another occasion, the British Ambassador further stated that while there was no direct document of plus point

² Barzani, Masud, (1999) *Barzani o Bzutnawayi Rzgarixwazi Kurd 1932-1945*, Xanie Press and publisher, Duhok, Kurdistan, p133; Ali, Osman, (2003) *Dirasat fi Al-Harakat Al-Tahriryia Al-Kurdiya 1883-1946 Dirasat Al-wasayiqiya*, Tafsir publisher, Erbil, Kurdistan, p150.

³ showani, Ako A. (2008) *Shari Sulamani xwondwayeki Mejuyi o Siyasi 1932-1945*, Kurdology center, Sulaimani, Kurdistan, p67; Jwaideh, Wadie, (2013) *The Kurdish nationalist movement: its origin and development*, translated by: group of translators, Aras publisher, Erbil, Kurdistan, p545.

⁴ Sornisn, Kristen. M, (2008) *Out of the mountains into politics: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq*, central European University, Budapest, Hungary, p15.

⁵ Chalili, chalili, (2010) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahriryia Kurdiya Al-Hadis*, translated by Abdi Hachi, Duhok, Kurdistan, Spirz press and Publisher, p235.

⁶ Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinji was one of the most well-known Iraqi Kurdish religious leader during the monarchy of Iraq period.

⁷ Qaftan, Kawis, (2003) *Antifa Al-Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and Publisher, p29.

discrimination against the Kurds, it was clear that the governments of Iraq had consistently supported a negative stance toward the Kurdish issue and their protests⁸. In a memorandum provided to London offices from the British embassy in Iraq, it was estimated that the Kurds of Iraq were “victims of incompetent and disloyalty governments likewise of the economic policy of the government of Iraq... the Kurds have apparently very real protests against the central government that no serious endeavor has yet been made to remove”⁹.

In light of such situations, Mullah Mustafa Barzani led a revolution against the government of Iraq in the Barzan province in the Kurdistan of Iraq in 1943¹⁰. The British Embassy in Iraq documented that Mustafa Barzani was leading the revolution and was demonstrating that neither his own demonstrates nor those of his fellow Kurds had managed via the government of Iraq in a satisfactory behavior¹¹. The British Embassy in Iraq received two letters, one from Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the other from a certain “Kurdish leadership headquarter” which was not elaborated in Mullah Mustafa Barzani revolt. In both the government of Iraq was accused of failing to find a rational resolve to the Kurdish issue¹². The British officials did not support an obvious stance in criticizing the government of Iraq on this view point. The British wished to create it impeccably apparent that the British itself was in no way responsible for the Kurdish dilemma in Iraq. Hitherto, it simultaneously sought to exploit the conflicts between the Kurds and the government of Iraq in Baghdad to their own positives, in moreover strengthening their station in Iraq. It appeared rational to conclude that the British could have figured out the Kurdish issue in the period 1920-1943 during which the state of Iraq was a British mandate. Even after the monarchy of Iraq became independent in 1932, the British maintained considerable influence upon the Iraqi governmental Kurdish policies¹³.

1.1 Mullah Mustafa Barzani Revolt 1943-1945

The Barzan areas were home grow to an upheaval in late 1943 and early 1944. This revolt entailed armed assault on the Iraqi polices posts and worried both the authorities of Iraq and British officials in Baghdad. In Baghdad, the persistence of such awful weakened the government of Iraq position and caused general instability on the developing political arena in the state of Iraq, particularly in Kurdistan areas. From the British humble opinion, the circumstance in the Barzan areas was illustrated as an embarrassment to the war effort of His Majesty’s government¹⁴. The British officials in Baghdad were keen on to see an end up to these disturbances likewise thus contacted Mullah Mustafa in order to familiarize themselves with the Kurdish demands. Mustafa Barzani requested from the British officials to Baghdad to instruct the Iraqi monarchy government to forgive him further to release the other Barzani chieftains who

⁸ Yassin, Borhanedin. A, (1995) *Vision or reality, the Kurds of Iran in the great powers policy 1941-1947*, Lund University, p130.

⁹ Chawik, Maruf, (2008) *Karasati Zomlekrawi Barzani*, translate to Kurdish by: Abu-Bakr Salih Ismail, Erbil Kurdistan, Mukriyani Publisher, p65; Edmonds, C. J, (2008) *Keshayi Kurd*, translated to Kurdish by: Abuker Salih Ismail, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, Mukryani publisher, p37.

¹⁰ Yassin, Borhanedin A, (1995) *Vision or reality, the Kurds of Iran in the great powers policy 1941-1947*, Lund University, p131.

¹¹ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p127.

¹² Yassin, Borhanedin A, (1995) *Vision or reality: the Kurds of Iran in the great powers policy 1941-1947*, Lund University, p131.

¹³ Qaftan, Kawis, (2003) *Antifa Al-Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and Publisher, p30.

¹⁴ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p235

were detained at the Hilla¹⁵ prison in the Southern of Iraq. In return Mustafa Barzani promised to keep up the peace process moreover order, although it was obvious that he wished to maintain undisturbed took over of the Barzan areas¹⁶.

The communication between Mullah Mustafa and the British official in Baghdad recommended that the revolt wished to give the impression that he had criticisms against the government of Iraq, conversely not against the British officials. Mullah Mustafa Barzani made it apparent to the British emissaries in Iraq that he was prepared and willing to listen to the British administration, for which “he expressed his deep affection in eloquent terms”¹⁷. This may have been interpreted as a calculated measure aiming to make a battle between the authorities of Iraq and British concerning the stance of the two toward the turmoil in Kurdistan areas. Mustafa Barzani was not, conversely triumphal in his endeavors. Although they frequent disapproved the authorities of Iraq for dwindling to cope with the circumstances, the British officials were determined to put an end to the uprising. Evaluating British policy toward the Barzan revolt, the U.S delegation in Baghdad concluded that British sympathy for Kurdish issue was obvious to both the revolt himself and to the central government in Baghdad. Conversely, the British estimated their long-term interests in Iraq, further these necessitated shore up of the government of Iraq. Hence, while the British agreed that the government of Iraq should have granted definite concession to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, they simultaneously propped up the armed forces of Iraq against Barzani revolt¹⁸. Indeed, on 21 December of 1943, the British officials or Embassy in Iraq issued a warning to Mullah Mustafa in the name of the government of British, which apparently observed that the British government was obligated to asses Mustafa Barzani’s intentions as unfriendly¹⁹.

Therefore, while there is document recommending that the British had some limited appreciation of Kurdish demonstrates, this was overwhelmed via the British shored up for and alliance with the government of Iraq. The British diplomatic relations records of the time do not indicate any British sympathy with Kurdish issue and Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s cause. Certainly, it seemed that in neither relation with the government of Iraq likewise in light of the government’s weakening position in the face of uprising, the British exploited the situation in Kurdistan to score political points.

It is equally key to estimate that Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s interactions with the British officials in Baghdad reveals that fact that the revolt’s demands were local in character, and hence failed to point out the general protests of the Kurds as an ethno-national group in Iraq. The government of Iraq and British officials both sought to options that might bring an end up to the Barzan revolt²⁰. The government of British and its envoys in Baghdad wished that the government of Baghdad would prop up a conciliatory position moreover facilitate a peaceful resolution. While the British were flexible likewise open Mullah Mustafa’s complaints and to the dilemma of the

¹⁵ Hilla is one city in the Sothern of Iraqi state. Author.

¹⁶ Barzani, Masud, (1999) *Barzani o Bzutnawayi Rzgariwazi Kurd 1932-1945*, Xanie Press and publisher, Duhok, Kurdistan, p133.

¹⁷ Sherwani, Hashmi, (2008) *Davaryi Barzan (Cography, Meju o dabunaritakan)*, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, p130.

¹⁸ F0371\35013. 14 December 1943. From Baghdad to foreign office, No. 1197.

¹⁹ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p129.

²⁰ Sornisn, Kristen. M, (2008) *Out of the mountains into politics: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq*, central European University, Budapest, Hungary, p17.

Kurds in general, the government of Iraq would have approved solely the entire surrender of Mustafa Barzani²¹.

In 1943, Mullah Mustafa Barzani who was legendary leader of the Kurdish movement at the beginning of his revolt, demanded from central government in Baghdad following demands:

1. The creation of Kurdistan autonomous region of an all-Kurdish areas embracing the city of Kirkuk²², Erbil²³, and Suleimania, as well as the Kurdish districts of Mosul in northern for instance, Dohuk²⁴, Akre, Zakho, Amediya, Sinjar, Zumar and Sheikhan²⁵ likewise the largely Kurdish district of Khanaqin²⁶ in Diyala city in eastern Iraq²⁷.
2. The appointment of a Kurdish official with cabinet rank to administer the newly created Kurdish region.
3. The appointment of a Kurdish undersecretary of each of the various ministers.
4. The culture, economic and agricultural autonomy of Kurdistan in the widest feasible sense, except in matters pertaining to the army and the gendarmerie.
5. The dismissal or transfer from Kurdish areas of officials known for corruption or mismanagement of authority.
6. The adoption of Kurdish language as an official language in the Kurdish areas²⁸.

The government of Iraq did, however, endeavoured to deliberate with Mustafa Barzani through various occasion. In the autumn of 1943, the commander of the forces of Iraq in northern military affairs General Muhammad Sai'd Al-Takriti was authorized by his government officials to undertake negotiations with Mustafa Barzani. The succeeding meetings were marked by the reluctant full forgiveness for himself further his men, including polices moreover army deserters; consideration of his claims on the return of sequestrated lands in the Barzan areas belonging to his family; likewise permission for the other Barzani Sheikhs, now in residence force in Hilla city, to return to their motherland²⁹. The converting terms of the government of Iraq were that Mustafa Barzani should have approved unconditional surrender in addition throw himself upon the mercy of the government³⁰. The British officials in Baghdad and British advisers in Iraq endeavored to persuade each side to cooperation. Major C.J Edmonds, a long time British

²¹ Shaaban, Abdul Hussein, (2000) *Barzani, on 33rd anniversary of his death*, Kurdistan, Kurdish Media, p3; Stansfield, Gareth, (2006) *The Kurdish question in Iraq 1914-1974*, Middle East series, London, p3.

²² Kirkuk is the name of a governorate in Northern Iraq. Kirkuk province inhabitants are mainly, Arabs, Turkmens, Kurds, and Assyrians. See Hanis, Shak Bernard, (2013) *the current Kurdish Iraqi government relations: an evaluation*, Journal of International Relations and Foreign Policy, vol.1.1 (2), p2.

²³ Erbil or Hewlêr as known in Kurdish language is one of the most ancient cities in the Middle East region which is located in the Middle of Kurdistan region and it is a capital city of the Kurdistan regional government nowadays.

²⁴ Dohuk is the third governorates in the Kurdistan region which is situated in the Northeast of Kurdistan region. Author.

²⁵ Akre, Zakho, Amediya, Sinjar, Zumar and Sheikhan are semi-governors likewise are belonging to the Dohuk governor officially in the North of the Kurdistan region. Author.

²⁶ Khanaqin is one of the Kurdish semi-governors in Iraq which is situated the near the Iraqi and Iran borders. Author.

²⁷ Diyala city is located to the northeast Baghdad in Iraq. Author

²⁸ Akyol, Harun, (2010), *from stalemate to soul mate: emergent Democracy in Kurdistan*, European Journal of economic and political studies, Ejepe-3, No1, p124.

²⁹ Ibid, p124.

³⁰ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p 129.

adviser to the ministry of affairs in Iraq and an expert on Kurdish issue, drafted a formal proposal to this end. The provisions stipulated by Edmonds likewise under which Mullah Mustafa Barzani was to apply the governments of Iraq presumed the integrity of the government of Iraq³¹. The conditions presented to Mustafa Barzani were as following:

- 1- After their submission, Mustafa Barzani and his followers would have been forgiven while elements as evidence deserters from army and polices would not be granted a pardon.
- 2- The returned of detained Barzani sheikhs in the Southern city of Hilla would be reconsidered via the administrations of Iraq.
- 3- The return of the Barzani Sheikhs land was moreover to be reconsidered.
- 4- Mullah Mustafa Barzani further his men were to surrender all captured arms and ammunition³².

Assumed the nature of these conditions, Mustafa Barzani would have been virtually discard himself at the mercy of the government of Iraq had he approved them. Additionally, the conditions did not oblige the administration to acquire any favorable considerations to Mustafa Barzani would have estimate himself in the same circumstances as previous to his flight, for instance in a state of residence force³³.

Mustafa Barzani articulated dissatisfaction of Edmonds application, urging that he would have prefer an honorable death to application to the government of Iraq. Up till now he recommended that he was willing to apply to the British, or to come to an agreement with the government of Iraq on the basis of a British assurance that the conditions would have carried out³⁴. According to the U.S representatives in Baghdad, by late December 1943, the British administration did exert stress on the government of Iraq by the Ambassador, the British military mission to the army of Iraq, what is more, the British adviser in the ministry of interior of Iraq, to arrange a nonviolent settlement³⁵.

1.2 The Iraqi Government Negotiation with Mullah Mustafa Barzani

The government of Iraq also sought after negotiating with the Kurdish revolt leaders all the way through Majid Mustafa³⁶, a minister with no portfolio for the Kurdistan region affairs, he himself was a moderate Kurdish and an independent personality pro-self-government. At a meeting in

³¹ Edmonds, C.J, (1971) *Kurdish nationalism, Journal of Contemporary History*, Vo1.6 (1), P9.; Edmonds, C. J, (2008) *Keshayi Kurd*, translated to Kurdish by: Abuker Salih Ismail, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, Mukryani publisher, p38.

³² Qaftan, Kawis, (2003) *Antifa Al-Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and Publisher, p33 ; OU-216691, (1948) *Britain and the Arab states a survey of Anglo-Arab Relations 1920-1948*, the U.K.

³³ Shaaban, Abdul Hussein, (2000) *Barzani, on 33rd anniversary of his death*, Kurdistan, Kurdish Media, p3; Tomi, Habib, (2012) *Mullah Mustafa Barzani Al-Qayid fi Asraha*, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, Aras press and publisher, p205.

³⁴ Edmonds, C. J, (2008) *Keshayi Kurd*, translated to Kurdish by: Abuker Salih Ismail, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, Mukryani publisher, p35.

³⁵ Edmonds, C.J, (1971) *Kurdish nationalism, Journal of Contemporary History*, Vo1.6, P10; sherwani, Mamakhan (1995). *Barzani o Binchinayi Barzaniyan*, Stockholm, p42; Qadir, Ahmed Muhammad Amen, (2007). *Halwisti Parlamani Barambari Keshayi Kurds 1925-1945*, first edition, Suleimani, Kurdistan, Jin publisher, p 157.

³⁶ Majid Mustafa held the portfolio minister in the eights government of Nuri Sa'id from 1943 to 1944 during the Barzan revolt, he then retired from his career as minister. However he died in 1973. See Omar, Ahmed Hamad Amen, (2007) *Andamakani Kurd la parlamani Iraq 1921-1958*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Mukriyani publisher, p37.

the district of Mergasur³⁷, the administrative center of the Barzan province, Mustafa Barzani and Majid discussed panoramas of a peace-agreement end to the rebellion³⁸. Additionally, schemes were accessible as following:

- 1- That Mullah Mustafa would have been permit to inhabit in countryside outside the Barzan province.
- 2- That Mullah Mustafa's bother Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, the head of the Barzani tribe, plus his followers would have allowed returning back to their hometown.
- 3- That the Kurdistan officers would have appointed to take on with the pacification in Barzan and other areas of Kurdistan under Majid's management.
- 4- That grain would have provided to the areas that had already suffered from skirmishing.
- 5- That the armed forces and troops of Iraq would have withdrawal from Mergasor, however some police place of duty would be re-established in that areas³⁹.

Majid has written out a description estimating events in Barzan areas, in which he renowned between the justifiable criticisms of the Kurds on the one hand, what is more the self-centeredness of certain Kurdish elements on the other. He continually pointed out that the complete situation was principally as a consequence of the breakdown of the administration of Iraq to manage with the dilemma of the Kurdish population⁴⁰. Majid Mustafa further maintained that apparent constituents and Mustafa Barzani in particular, were taking advantage of the political volatility and grievances of the population in the Kurdistan for their own upsides. Mullah Mustafa and his followers were inclined to believe that the authorities of Iraq in Sulaimaniya had been treated them disappointingly. Majid Mustafa endeavoured to reach a peace-agreement solve to the Barzan question proved futile⁴¹.

Moreover, in May 1944, Nuri-Al-Sa'id⁴² toured Kurdistan region to win local support and publicize the new government internal policy. The prime minister met with Kurdish leaders, heard their complaints, and gave speeches on the theme of Arab and Kurdish unity within the state of Iraq. Nuri proclaimed that the Kurds were an integral part of Iraq and that they should have treated as Iraqis, a policy he laid out in his reports on that trip. " The Kurds of Iraq have no objectives at variance with those of the rest of the people of Iraq. The Kurds of Iraq, like other

³⁷ Mergasor is one semi-governor in Sothern of the Kurdistan of Iraq.

³⁸ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p127, p130; Edmonds, C. J, (2008) *Keshayi Kurd*, translated to Kurdish by: Abuker Salih Ismail, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, Mukryani publisher, p36.

³⁹ Qaftan, Kawis, (2003) *Antifa Al-Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and Publisher ; p28; Chawik, Maruf, (2008) *Karasati Zomlekravi Barzani*, translate to Kurdish by: Abu-Bakr Salih Ismail, Erbil Kurdistan, Mukriyani Publisher, p129.

⁴⁰ OU-216691, (1948) *Britain and the Arab states a survey of Anglo-Arab Relations 1920-1948*, the U.K; Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p127, p129.

⁴¹ Nuri, Fradun, (2007) *Bzavi Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and publisher, p135; Chalili, chalili;(2010) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahriryia Kurdiya Al-Hadis*, translated by Abdi Hachi, Duhok, Kurdistan, Spirz press and Publisher, p133.

⁴² Nuri Sa'id :(1888-1958). One of the founders of the modern Iraqi state, a dominated political figure, He played an active role in the campaign that brought Feisal to power as a king of Iraq. He became prime minister for 15 times within several posts until his death on 15 July 1958. See Dusky, Hozan Suleiman. , (2010) *Nuri Sa'id o role wi d siyasata navta Iraqe da*, Vo1.4 (196), 2010, p92.

Iraqis, seek reform of the administration and believe that attention should be paid to the educational system, health, economic development and other vital matters, which sooner or later must necessarily be carried out in all parts of Iraq in order to raise the standard of living of the people, increase their efficiency and develop their national rights and resources... we must look upon Iraq as one comprehensive entity and must undertake comprehensive reforms for the benefit and welfare of all "⁴³.

Kurdistan might be suffering from ignore, however the resolve was not to treat it as an exceptional case, conversely to bring it up to the level of the rest of the country of Iraq.

On 16th June, 1944, Sir Kinhan Cornwallis⁴⁴, the British Ambassador in Baghdad, met up with the interior minister of Iraq to moreover converse the political situation in the Kurdistan of Iraq and the Barzan revolt particularly. The minister admitted that force should have provided as a last resort plus that every effort should first of all be created to expand the confidence of Mustafa Barzani and fostered him to give up his arms along with disperse his fighting. There is no evidence as to whether the legation utterly sees eye to eye with this position. On the contrary, he was encouraged that the most capacity to figure out the Barzan question was to isolate Mullah Mustafa Barzani from the intact the Kurdistan dilemma. This could have accomplished Kurdish applications satisfyingly via the adoption of a bighearted policy. Therefore, Cornwallis even had recommended that the government of Iraq straight away announce a program to get strength to strength the state of affairs in the Kurdistan region. The Ambassador was inclined to believe that formerly his recommendation was followed, Mustafa Barzani, as an alternative of being contemplated a supporter of the Kurdish civil rights, would nearly all probably degeneration into his appropriate position⁴⁵. The getting-together consequence in a peace-agreement on the three main points objective at working out the Barzan matter, according to that the central government should have done these below points to the Kurds of Iraq:

1. Straight away formulate it recognized that it anticipated to take up a bighearted internal policy towards the Kurdish people.
2. Directly contemplated what ventures, schools, hospitals, roads and so on, should have undertaken that years. Publicly should have been giving to the agenda amongst the Kurdish plus authentic work conducted as soon as rapidly.
3. Confiscate the occupying force from the district of Billê ⁴⁶ (an administrative district in Barzan province)⁴⁷.

⁴³ McDowall, David, (2004). *A modern history of the Kurds*, New York, the United States, p291.

⁴⁴ Sir Kinhan Cornwallis (1883-1959) was the British ambassador in Iraq from 1941 to 1945. On 3 of July 1959 he died in London. See Ahmed. , Kamal Mazhar, (2009) *Kurd O Kurdistan La Balga Namakani Nehni Baritaniya Da*, first part, Lebanon, Abdullah Zangana and Shahla Tahir Hadari. Ed.

⁴⁵ Hos, D.K. Field, (2010) *Kurd, Arab and Baretaniya*, translated by Emad Jamil Mzuri, first edition, Duhok, Kurdistan, Speriz press and publisher., p348; McDowall, David, (2004). *A modern history of the Kurds*, New York, the United States, p230; Sherwani, Hashmi, (2008) *Davaryi Barzan (Cography, Meju o dabunaritakan)*, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, p130.

⁴⁶ Billê is one district in the Barzan province.

⁴⁷ Qaftan, Kawis, (2003) *Antifa Al-Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and Publisher, p34 ; Sherwani, Hashmi, (2008) *Davaryi Barzan (Cography, Meju o dabunaritakan)*, first edition, Erbil, Kurdistan, p134.

The interior minister of Iraq, who was acknowledged to have an anti-Kurdish stance, was unwilling to take the obligatory steps to comprehend what had been endorsed upon between the British legation and him. The interior minister sought after to at least provisionally hold back peak by messaging that there was no 'budgetary provision', and spot through stating that the withdrawal of the occupying forces from Billê involved plenty of time. Abruptly on 24th June 1944 after having a meeting the prime minister of Iraq had made a declaration, in which he constructed it comprehensible that the central government had no purposes of undertaking any detailed program for the Kurdistan region yet⁴⁸. On the ground that, two days later, Mustafa Barzani provided a letter to the government of Iraq specifically prime minister further in the name of the Kurds, he requested from the central government to have a meeting the request reforms. The British legation reacted to this letter via providing a manipulated to Mullah Mustafa admitted him to leave politics at once⁴⁹.

What is more, endeavors were even made to foster Mustafa Barzani to break up his armed following plus to surrender the goes through which had incarcerated from Iraqi armed forces last fall. In revisit for Mullah Mustafa's collaboration in this crisis, it was mostly identify with that the troops of Iraq in Billê would have been withdrawn. Major Edward Kinch⁵⁰, taking action as a British political adviser in the Northern region even his task was to push Mustafa Barzani to stop aggression against the central government, at the same time as further advising him that in the long-standing, his insubordinate policy would in the end consequence in catastrophe for him moreover depression for his supports and peoples⁵¹. The British officials were conscious of the actuality that Mustafa Barzani had through this time comprehensive his influence over the areas between Amediyie, Akre and Rewandoz⁵² plus the Turkish and Persian frontiers. Mullah Mustafa Barzani was continually working on an alliance with the leaders of Zêbari tribe⁵³. Thus, Sir Edward Kinch's consciousness was that any resolution between Mustafa Barzani and central government in Baghdad would have been deeply awkward to reach. He additionally kept up that the policy of conciliating Mustafa Barzani has been unsuccessful along with that the solely substitute departed for the government of Iraq was to set up the army for an operation alongside the revolt leaders. By contrast, the British Ambassador gave an opinion to the British government in London that it was in the interest of the British that horrible situation in Kurdistan be kept away from any war at this time.

The revolt of Mustafa Barzani kept it up even hard work to solve the question passing through negotiations over and over again not succeed⁵⁴. The government of Iraq adored going to put into operation a military figure out booted consequently. The British apprehension over the turmoil

⁴⁸ Jwaideh, Wadie (2013) *The Kurdish nationalist movement: its origin and development*, translated by: group of translators, Aras publisher, Erbil, Kurdistan, p554.

⁴⁹ Barzani, Masud, (1999) *Barzani o Bzutnawayi Rzgarixwazi Kurd 1932-1945*, Xanie Press and publisher, Duhok, Kurdistan, p133, p136.

⁵⁰ Edward Kinch was one of the British political advisers in Iraq. See Hos, D.K. Field, (2010) *Kurd, Arab and Baretaniya*, translated by Emad Jamil Mzuri, first edition, Duhok, Kurdistan, Speriz press and publisher, p348.

⁵¹ Ibid, p349; Chalili, chalili;(2010) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahrirya Kurdiya Al-Hadis*, translated by Abdi Hachi, Duhok, Kurdistan, Spiz press and Publisher, p134.

⁵² Rewandoz is one of the Kurdistan region semi-governorates which situated in the governorate of Erbil.

⁵³ Hos, D.K. Field, (2010) *Kurd, Arab and Baretaniya*, translated by Emad Jamil Mzuri, first edition, Duhok, Kurdistan, Speriz press and publisher., p348; Chawik, Maruf, (2008) *Karasati Zomlekrawi Barzani*, translate to Kurdish by: Abu-Bakr Salih Ismail, Erbil Kurdistan, Mukriyani Publisher, p139.

⁵⁴ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon, p132.

along with the wide-ranging situation in Kurdistan of Iraq turned out to be constantly supplementary unmistakable. First and foremost, the British officials deeply dreaded that the Barzani rebellion would have led to collaboration among Kurds throughout gigantic Kurdistan. The concept might spread to other parts of an Iraqi state. Additionally, the Kurds of Iraq might have sought get in touch with the USSR, henceforth turn into instrumental in the advancement of the USSR goals⁵⁵. From the British officials point of view must have been understood in light of the British's foreign policy plus economic attention in the region. The revolt could exemplify consequence in a situation where the officers of Iraq would have instigated to take accomplishment against the British authority in Iraq. Even in a telegram which provided from the foreign affairs minister of Iraq Arashad Al-Umari⁵⁶, told the British Embassy in Baghdad, the Kurdistan condition was deeply mysterious and serious. The minister afraid of that woefully terrified may well hit the roof not later that the fall, moreover that all-inclusive accomplishment was being schemed, taking up not only Kurdish tribesmen in Iraq, nevertheless, also those in Persia, Syria and Turkey⁵⁷.

From minister perspective, current description from Tabriz undoubtedly pointed toward that USSR had already a part in all of this. The British officials were, on the contrary, bringing up to date via the minister of foreign affairs of Iraq that there was candidly no indication of USSR commotion in the Kurdistan region. On the other hand, the minister considered that there was a ground to suppose that envoys from Mullah Mustafa Barzani had already been provided to the Kurdistan of Iraq, where they may have been kept in touch with dissident fundamentals⁵⁸. The minister was predominantly concentration on the regional dimension of developments in Kurdistan. An all-embracing Kurdish revolt might have encouraged of Kurds in Iran into likewise stroke, where the government would have be virtually incapable in the face of such an improvement plus the Kurds in Turkey, where the government had already strength to strength to cope somewhat ruthlessly with the Kurds. The minister contemplated that any Kurdish rebellion in Iraq could generate Turkish occupations into Iraqi Kurdistan for the rationale of restoring order. It was for this reason straight away the governments of Iraq had token exploits to resolve the situation before it goes downhill⁵⁹.

The government of Iraq wished to keep the U.S. bring up to date of Iraqi Kurdistan meanings along with of which measure the government of Iraq would have assumed against the Barzan revolt. Continually, the foreign affairs minister of Iraq, who was even the acting as minister of defense kept it posted to the U.S. minster to Baghdad that the government of Iraq premeditated to launch a far-reaching operation against the Barzani revolt⁶⁰. The British ambassador himself was

⁵⁵ Yassin, Borhanedin A, (1995) *Vision or reality, the Kurds of Iran in the great powers policy 1941-1947*, Lund University, p131.

⁵⁶ Arashad Al-Umari (1888-?) was Iraqi Prime minister and cabinet official during the monarchy. He was removed as minister when he refused to sign the United Nations charter of his personal disagreements with some of the phraseology. See Ghareeb, Edmund A., (2004). *A historical dictionary of Iraq*, the United States of America, p1130.

⁵⁷ Mhyidin, Wehid Omar, (2006) *Danostandnakani Sarkrdayati Kurd La Gall Hkumatakani Iraq 1921-1968 Political Studies*, Sulaimani, Kurdistan strategic center, p554.

⁵⁸ McDowall, David, (2004). *A modern history of the Kurds*, New York, the United States, p 356 Jwaideh, Wadie, (2013) *The Kurdish nationalist movement: its origin and development*, translated by: group of translators, Aras publisher, Erbil, Kurdistan, p555.

⁵⁹ Ali, Osman, (2003) *Dirasast fi Al-Harakat Al-Tahriryia Al-Kurdiya 1883-1946 Dirasat Al-wasayiqiya*, Tafsir publisher, Erbil, Kurdistan, p275.

⁶⁰ Yassin, Borhanedin A, (1995) *Vision or reality, the Kurds of Iran in the great powers policy 1941-1947*, Lund University, p149.

firmly believed that Mullah Mustafa's situation was crystallizing furthermore diplomatic quantify would not have be productive. Hitherto the Ambassador pointed out that the head of the British military Mission in Iraq; moreover, others anticipated that the army of Iraq was in no stipulation to presuppose military action alongside Mullah Mustafa⁶¹.

The marvelous option, the legation admitted, was to relinquish areas which could not have protected further to cut off the region economically. What is more, also in accordance with the recommendation of apparent British officers, the government of Iraq then should straight away begin concentrated on work to restructure and train the army, to incorporate the formation of a mountain splitting up. The dilemmas of British aircraft assistance to the Iraqi army build in every action that was to be undertaken alongside the followers of Mustafa Barzani. The legation had already made it comprehensible to the foreign affairs minister of Iraq that no such assistance could be expected. Since the British had reasonably an adequate amount of on their hands likewise had either the men or the equipment to spare for undertaking in Kurdistan region⁶². From fall of 1944 plus up to the collapse of the Barzani revolt in late 1945, the international policy measurement of the Barzan revolt had turned out to be progressively further preponderant. Prospective Soviet participation in the revolt did skyrocket, and this in turn stimulated U.S.A apprehensions.

1.3 The British Policy toward the Kurdish Issue 1943-1945

The British policy towards the Kurds of Iraq or Kurdish issue was for the most part characterized by carefulness. This is reflected, for instance, in British's reaction to the possibility of recruiting the Kurds in Iraq to serve in British armed forces against the Kurdish movement. In 1942, the British opposing the capacity of recruiting Kurds, Armenians and Assyrians, The question had booted with the war officers by the British commander in chief to the Middle East region. The position of the British foreign office was that namely a measure might have antagonized majority elements plus would place the British government under compulsions to the minorities which may well prove potential to fulfill after the war. A well-known British prime minister and politician Winston Churchill himself conserved the recruitment proposal even maintained that it would have representation him to much adverse criticism if he were to agree to open recruitment in Iraq for British forces. Henceforth, it certainly appears that the British gave up from making any promise to the Kurds in order to stop happening awkwardness of the central government in Baghdad and conceivably of that in Turkey⁶³.

The British officials probably wanted a fair settlement for the Kurdish issue. The British had worked for more than twenty years to get one. It would have continued to do so, but the British ambassador to Baghdad had to use his influence behind the sense because it was however essential that the British did not appear to be interfering directly in Kurdish issue in Iraq as it has always estimated it's an Iraqi external issue⁶⁴.

⁶¹ Chalili, chalili;(2010) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahriryia Kurdiya Al-Hadis*, translated by Abdi Hachi, Duhok, Kurdistan, Spirz press and Publisher, p138.

⁶² F0371\35013. 14 December 1943. From Baghdad to foreign office, No. 1197, Ibid.

⁶³ Muho, Sadiq Osman, (2010) *The role of the foreign factor in declining the Kurdish uprisings, the British role in declining the first and second revolts of Barzan 1931-1945*, Erbil, Kurdistan, ,intellectuals ministry foundation, p 192.

⁶⁴ Wichhar, Stefanie. K, (2011). *A new deal for the Kurds: British 's Kurdish policy in Iraq 1941-1945*, the Journal of imperial and commonwealth history, vo1.39(5), p130.

The British foreign policy towards Iraq discussed in a staff meeting of the British legation in Baghdad, with meticulous focus on British's foreign policy towards the Kurdish issue of Iraq. It was declared that, what is more to the realization of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance of 1930, British policy in comparison with Iraq entailed three main fundamentals:

- 1- To make certain by taking up a policy of friendship, that the government of Iraq and the people of Iraq should have the funds for every assistance to our armed forces in a spirit of willing co-operation.
- 2- To give confidence to the government of Iraq and the Iraqi people to participate to the war effort, particularly by skyrocketing the production of the country.
- 3- On the whole, to maintain British wellbeing⁶⁵.

The British ambassador was particularly concerned with the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of the alliance of 1930, which had already assured non-involvement of the British in Iraq's internal administration and political issues. The legation admitted that the sole exception to this had been the case of the Kurdish, more precisely the involvement of the British Embassy in providing a warning to Mullah Mustafa Barzani. At the meeting, the situation in the Kurdistan of Iraq was illustrated as unsatisfactory and as requiring most watchful monitoring. It was also stated the conflict between the Kurdish armed forces and the government of Iraq was long-standing plus that a solution of the Kurdish question would also be to the upside of the government of Iraq⁶⁶.

The British Ambassador argued that if the government of Iraq were forced to implement reforms in Kurdistan against its own will, any succeeding developments would have been exclusively temporary. It was moreover admitted that the British officials could do nothing whether the Iraqi government turned against the Kurds after the close of the war. On the contrary, the Ambassador of British remarked that he had been involved in efforts to work out pressure designed to foster the central government to take up a more sympathetic position upon the Kurdish dilemma. The British understood that the fundamental grievance of the Kurds in Iraq was derivation in a Kurdistan mistrust of the Iraqi government in Baghdad. It seems that the British sought after doing some type of sense of balance between the Kurds and the government of Iraq hitherto could not abandon their own strategic alliance with the central government of Iraq. In the other words, they prioritized their own interests which were here best secured by means of collaboration with the central government in Baghdad⁶⁷.

The concept of the British Kurdish policy in this framework designates the official policy of the British government in the Middle East region. Likewise, the conduct of the British legation in Baghdad towards the Kurds⁶⁸; the British Embassy was in direct communication with the

⁶⁵ sherwani, Mamakhan (1995). *Barzani o Binchinayi Barzaniyan*, Stockholm, p139; Yassin, Borhanedin A, (1995) *Vision or reality, the Kurds of Iran in the great powers policy 1941-1947*, Lund University, p148.

⁶⁶ Sornisn, Kristen. M, (2008) *Out of the mountains into politics: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq*, central European University, Budapest, Hungary, p 15.

⁶⁷ McDowall, David, (2004). *A modern history of the Kurds*, New York, the United States, p335; Wichhar, Stefanie. K, (2011). *A new deal for the Kurds: British 's Kurdish policy in Iraq 1941-1945*, the Journal of imperial and commonwealth history, vol.39(5), p130.

⁶⁸ Sornisn, Kristen. M, (2008) *Out of the mountains into politics: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq*, central European University, Budapest, Hungary, p16.

government of Iraq further was at times involved in making contact with Kurds, and the Embassy interpreted the principal features of the British government's policy.

Additionally, another level of policy involved British officers who worked locally in Kurdish districts, and who were in contact with the Kurds and their every-day life. These officers could observe the unsatisfactory situation in Kurdistan first-hand, plus could straight away be affected by Kurdish assessment against the government of Iraq. Consequently, the British legation in Baghdad knowledgeable these officers, they could be outlook as disloyal whether they expressed disagreement with their own government's policy. It was for that reason that the British officers be most cautious in what they said to the local Kurdish population. It was later reasserted that members of the political advisory staff in the Kurdish areas were not to concern themselves with sectional politics or personal disputes, and is to do everything to oppose the carried out development of a minority complex⁶⁹.

The government of Iraq was nonetheless convinced that British officers in Baghdad were, internationally or not, giving the impression that they sympathized with the ambitions of the Kurds issue. The foreign affairs minister of Iraq Arshad Al-Umari was telling off the British officers in Iraq for the behavior of many British officers in heartening Kurdish nationalism. The British officials indeed avoided dealing with Kurds and other ethno-national minorities as specific national groups. As an alternative, the individuals belonging to like groups were to be viewed strictly in their emphasize that all grievances would have be directed to the government of Iraq passing through constitutional channels⁷⁰.

The British inclined to believe a policy aiming not only at the integration of the Kurds issue into the Iraqi state, however even at their assimilation. The British Ambassador in Baghdad stated that in the long run it would prove better to pursue a policy aimed at fostering assimilation. On the other hand, the British Ambassador asserted that he and the Embassy staffs should have encouraged the government of Iraq to launch a programmed of development in educational systems and social services in the Kurdistan areas a long ago ⁷¹. The Kurds also be given the opportunity to hold a proper share in government posts. The British Ambassador conducted that these aspects of the British position should have made obvious to the government of Iraq. The Iraqis were further to be informed that the British foreign policy towards the Kurds issue as was asserted in an Aide Memoire addressed to the prime ministers of Iraq, was in apparent harmony with the paying attention of the Kingdom of Iraq⁷².

In keeping with these assumptions, the British Embassy inclined to believe that the administration of Iraq needed to institute policies that would civilize and settle the Kurdish people, among the most backward in Iraq, bringing order to a chaotic region. As the British embassy report suggested that the Kurds would continue to be an element of consider and a danger to the security of the greater part of the Northern areas of the country. The way to tame

⁶⁹sherwani, Mamakhan (1995). *Barzani o Binchinayi Barzaniyakan*, Stockholm, p140; F0371\35013. 14 December 1943. From Baghdad to foreign office, No. 1197.

⁷⁰ Chalili, chalili;(2010) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahrirya Kurdiya Al-Hadis*, translated by Abdi Hachi, Duhok, Kurdistan, Spirz press and Publisher, p138.

⁷¹ Chawik, Maruf, (2008) *Karasati Zomlekravi Barzani*, translate to Kurdish by: Abu-Bakr Salih Ismail, Erbil Kurdistan, Mukriyani Publisher, p 193 ; sherwani, Mamakhan (1995). *Barzani o Binchinayi Barzaniyakan*, Stockholm, p 141.

⁷² Qaftan, Kawis, (2003) *Antifa Al-Barzani*, Erbil, Kurdistan, Araz press and Publisher, p45; F0371\35013. 14 F0371\35013. 14 December 1943. From Baghdad to foreign office, No. 1197, *ibid*.

the Kurds issue is not to fight them but to civilize them. This could be achieved through development projects in the Kurdish areas, including immediate famine relief, irrigation schemes, road building to provide infrastructure and taking them on plus reform of the tobacco monopoly. Such a friendly and constructive, would tranquillizes turbulent people and make them useful citizens of the country, bring credit to Iraq on the international community stages for treating its people well, less the chance of frontier disturbances, and save money on military operations⁷³. As Stewart Perowne, the oriental counselor, reasoned in 1945, 'gradually economics overcome over politics, moreover civilization seeps in. conversely it is takes too much time'⁷⁴.

The British wished that modernization further security would not only reconcile the majority of the Kurds of the Iraqi state, but also deteriorated the authority of traditional leaders. The British was highly skeptical of Mullah Mustafa Barzani's alleges to guidance of a larger Kurdish nationalist liberation movement, viewing him as a poseur and imposter a relic of the Kurdish tribal leader past endeavoring to clothe himself in the grab of a modern nationalist leader. An embassy official advised London that Mustafa Barzani, whose outlook at the moment may have compared with that Adolf Hitler after Munich, is not interested in the politico-economic welfare of the Kurds, nor does he care about hospital or schools. Therefore they sought to that he should have left his country and the British ambassador sent him a letter and said to him that you should have left Kurdistan to go elsewhere long ago⁷⁵.

The man was a bandit chieftain, and all he wanted was freedom to live feudally in leadership over his armed force followers despite the fact that levying tribute on the cowed and the defenseless. The best way to undermine the nationalist dimension of the Mullah Mustafa Barzani revolt was to separate it from what the British contemplated legitimate Kurdish grievances, for instance, needy administration and limited investment in infrastructure, which hindered economic development. From Edmond points of view, the Kurdish dilemma' should have been treading primarily as an administrative issue. He further told the regent that no sensible Kurd believed that the rebellions would bring real change. By contrast, they would not act to support the government if they believed that it was unresponsive to their protests⁷⁶.

In a prescient comment, he observed that a minority always tended to attribute omissions for deliberate design' and the Kurds would see the inequality between provisions for their region and other parts of Iraq in this light. Iraq should have provided sympathetic and responsive officials in Kurdistan regions and offer social service available in other parts of the country⁷⁷. Edmonds reasoned that whether the government of Iraq would follow through on the proposed reforms,

⁷³ Qadir, Ahmed Muhammad Amen, (2007). *Halwisti Parlamani Barambari Keshayi Kurds 1925-1945*, first edition, Suleimani, Kurdistan, Jin publisher, p158.

⁷⁴ Sornisn, Kristen. M, (2008) *Out of the mountains into politics: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq*, central European University, Budapest, Hungary, p819.

⁷⁵ F0371\45340. (1945). English original of a letter sent in Arabic by .H.M. Ambassador to Mullah Mustafa ; Wichhar, Stefanie. K, (2011). *A new deal for the Kurds: British 's Kurdish policy in Iraq 1941-1945*, the Journal of imperial and commonwealth history, vo1.39(5),p158 .

⁷⁶ F0371\45340. (1945). English original of a letter sent in Arabic by .H.M. Ambassador to Mullah Mustafa .Ibid; Muho, Sadiq Osman, (2010) *The role of the foreign factor in declining the Kurdish uprisings, the British role in declining the first and second revolts of Barzan 1931-1945*, Erbil, Kurdistan, ,intellectuals ministry foundation, p194.

⁷⁷ Sornisn, Kristen. M, (2008) *Out of the mountains into politics: the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq*, central European University, Budapest, Hungary, p17.

then they would be able to treat the situation in Barzan. Namely any ordinary tribal horrible of limited scope Mustafa Barzani would have lost the basis for his support and this would, as Cornwallis observed, spoil his largely bogus pose of title holder of Kurdish rights. This policy would moreover create an opportunity for the expansion of the power of the central government into Kurdish areas, an aim shared by both the government of Iraq and the British⁷⁸.

The British arguments extolling the benefits of developments project in Kurdish areas reflected the long-held assumptions about the need to civilize and modernize the Kurds. Equally serving British wartime strategic priorities⁷⁹, the British emphasized on social and economic reform also complemented the new imperial policy of the post-war Labor government. In a meeting with the British head of mission in the Middle Eastern countries in September 1945, Ernest Bevin⁸⁰, the labor foreign secretary announced a new policy towards the region was so-called a New Deal policy⁸¹. He stated that, "we should have broaden the base on which British influence rests furthermore to this end should improve a social policy and an economic that would have made for the prosperity plus contentment of the areas as whole... we should do all that we could to increase the social betterment of the people of the Middle East region"⁸². Despite the fact that the complicate motivations behind Bevin's policy lie outside the capacity of this article differ from many of the assumptions that underlay the Kurds of Iraq " New Deal Policy", there are striking similarities in the British rhetoric used to demonstrate these modernization project and a shared belief that economic reform and development would deflate claims by both Arab and Kurdish nationalists⁸³.

The new deal reconcile the Kurds to the Iraqi sate; Bevin's peasants not pashas' policy would reconcile disgruntled Arab nationalist to keep up British influence in the Middle East and stave off growing USSR and U.S.A influence in the region. Thompson, the British authority charg e d'affaire at thie Embassy in Baghdad, supported the recommendations that increased from Bevin's conference owing to: deeply long, it appears that, have we refrained in our official pronouncements from registering any interest whatever in the wellbeing this⁸⁴. Nevertheless, by emphasizing the modernity of our thought and action, we could influential in our favor the many, motionless hugely unorganized and inarticulate, who now days in Iraq search for a better life for their fellows. In 1945, the British's support for development projects in Kurdish areas, derivation

⁷⁸Chalili, chalili, (2010) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahriryia Kurdiya Al-Hadis*, translated by Abdi Hachi, Duhok, Kurdistan, Spirz press and Publisher, p138 ; Edmonds, C.J, (1971) *Kurdish nationalism, Journal of Contemporary History*, Vo1.6, P10.

⁷⁹ Wichhart, Stefanie Katharine, (2007) *.intervention British, Egypt and Iraq during World War two*, the University of Texas at Austin, p148.

⁸⁰ Ernest Bevin (1881-1951). A British labor politician and a statesmen, he served as a general secretary of the powerful transport and general workers' union from 1922 to 1940 plus minister of labor in the war time coalition government and his more crucial role came as a foreign secretary in the post-war labor government 1945-1951. See Wichhar, Stefanie. K, (2011). *A new deal for the Kurds: British 's Kurdish policy in Iraq 1941-1945*, the Journal of imperial and commonwealth history, vol.39(5), p148.

⁸¹Ibid, p825; Wichhart, Stefanie Katharine, (2007) *.intervention British, Egypt and Iraq during World War two*, the University of Texas at Austin, p152.

⁸² Ibid, p825; Ibid, p152.

⁸³ Al-Barzani, Aziz Hassan, (2006) *Al-Haraka Al-Tahririya Al-Kurdiya fi Kurdistan Iraq 1939-1945*, Biuret, Lebanon,,p168; Muho ,Sadiq Osman, *The role of the foreign factor*, Ibid, p194.

⁸⁴ Wichhart, Stefanie Katharine, (2007) *.intervention British, Egypt and Iraq during World War two*, the University of Texas at Austin, p 126.

in the paternalistic assumptions of the mandate period, dovetailed with the labor government's vision for the region as whole.

The British officials in Iraq shored up this new policy, putting stress upon the government of Iraq to summon what it was demonstrated as a "New Deal policy" for the Kurdish issue. Gornwallis successor as a new British Ambassador, Sir Francis Hugh Stonehewer Bird, estimated that, "it was here in the capital, not among the towns and tribal leaders of the Kurdistan region, that Kurdish interests could be best be increase plus safeguarded. Majid Mustafa's proposal complemented the Embassy's own viewpoint that Mustafa Barzan's revolt was up till now another installment in the ongoing struggle between a modern centralizing state plus traditional tribal administration. Embassy officials learned Kurdish tribal leaders as reactionary and obsolete, further British's role was to gently coax them into shedding their old approach, as a patient parent. The ambassador advised London that "this process of quick, almost violent, alter from ancient to modern is, for well or evil, going on throughout Kurdistan areas. Naturally, it was resented via those who, like Mustafa Barzani, could have no part in it. It is our mission I feel, while presenting sympathy with the ancient, to endeavor to guide plus conciliates the new"⁸⁵.

Conversely, the British and the armed forces of Iraq had difficulty in defeating Mullah Mustafa Barzani and enlisted the shoring up of other Kurds in return for money also arms, revealing the division within the Kurdish leaders plus the limitations of the Barzan revolt. Mustafa Barzani, his brother, and some of their followers escaped in the spring. Majid Mustafa was condemned as a traitor to the nationalist issue, moreover Hope party collapsed⁸⁶.

After the collapse of Barzan revolt, Mullah Mustafa fled to Iran appeared to be the end of this episode in the history of Iraq, however it was in fact only an interlude. The USSR, who was then, invaded Northern Iran, permitted Mullah Mustafa to settle in a village in western Iranian Azerbaijan, where Mustafa Barzani established contacts with the Kurdish nationalist movement in East Kurdistan. An independent Kurdistan state so-called the Republic of Kurdistan, was found on 22January of 19646, Mullah Mustafa plus his fighters formed the most sufficient wing of the new Kurdistan State's military forces. He started up gigantic raids on its behalf likewise after the collapse of the Kurdistan Republic at the end of the year. He sought the refuge in the USSR⁸⁷.

Was Mullah Mustafa Barzani's revolt nationalist in Mother Nature or, as the British officials and Iraqis illustrated it, an "isolated tribal revolt"? This question had deeply serious implications for the Kurds of Iraq, British officials and Iraqis that framework beyond the historical record⁸⁸. Form Masu'd Barzani points of view, "Mustafa Barzani's intentions in rising against the administrations of Iraq were nationalistic all along, British and Iraq realized that this was not '... a tribal rebellion, limited to a few mountains, which they could suppress simply. This was an armed national insurrection propped up by the Kurdish people in the Kurdistan of Iraq

⁸⁵ See Wichhar, Stefanie. K, (2011). *A new deal for the Kurds: British 's Kurdish policy in Iraq 1941-1945*, the Journal of imperial and commonwealth history, vol.39(5), p819.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 826.

⁸⁷ Wichhart, Stefanie Katharine, (2007) *.intervention British, Egypt and Iraq during World War two*, the University of Texas at Austin, p152.

⁸⁸ F0371\45340.10August1945. From Baghdad to foreign office, No 260; Wichhar, Stefanie Stefanie. K., *A new deal for the Kurds*, vol.39 (5), Ibid, p156.

particularly the educated in addition to it was a symbol of Kurdish aspirations”⁸⁹. While historians are divided on this point, many might have been shoring up David McDowall’s statement that, “rather than Mullah Mustafa choosing nationalism, the nationalist chose him”⁹⁰. The Mullah Mustafa Barzani revolt was significant as the point when tribal grievances and the legitimacy of traditional Kurdish leaders were first harnessed by Kurdish urban intellectuals in the interest of a larger national goals, although the effort and the British New Deal policy was unsuccessful at the end⁹¹. Certainly, until the defeat of his rebellion in 1945, Mustafa Barzani repeatedly called for a Kurdish self-determination under the British protection.

Conclusion

The Barzani revolt of 1943-1945 was a preponderant step along Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s footpath to Kurdish nationalist leadership, likewise his role in the Kurdistan Republic (Mahabad Republic of 1946) , his effective military operations, moreover his fled to the USSR turned him into a Kurdish hero in the contemporary Kurdish nationalist movement. When he return to the new Republic of Iraq after the 1958 military coup, his rhetoric reflected gigantic nationalist objectives plus he had transformed himself as a national, rather than simply tribal head.

The Mullah Mustafa Barzani rebellion bothered both the administrations of Iraq and the British for many reasons. For the Iraqi government, it was a direct opposition to the central government in Baghdad at a time when its legitimacy was already weakened owing to the coup of 1941. The government of Iraq replied was complicated via its role in the nationalist movement of the Arab unity that would, via definition, subsume Iraq’s minority communities into a gigantic Arab object. The British committed to constructing a strong the state of Iraq, up till now many officials felt a lingering sense of guilt for abandoning the Kurds of Iraq during the mandate period. In the end, the administrations of Iraq and British both had economic and politics interests in limiting the impact of the Kurdish issue and portraying Mullah Mustafa Barzani as a traditional tribal leader who speculatively seized the banner of Kurdish nationalist liberation movement to moreover his personal agenda. Blossoming Kurdish nationalism posed a direct danger to the state-building project that tied the British and the government of Iraq interests together.

The approaching end of the war led British officials in Baghdad and London to reassess its priorities; moreover the Kurdish question lost much of its urgency. In this example, British and the priorities of Iraq aligned plus British policy of privileging the Iraqi center over the Kurdish strategy, combined with Baghdad’s unwillingness to institute real alter in its Kurdish administrations, ultimately signaled the death of the short-lived British Kurdish new deal policy . Hitherto, the Barzani revolt that inspired these policies had taken its place in the Kurdish historical narrative as defining moment in the formation of a modern Kurdish nationalist liberation movement in the Kurdistan of Iraq.

⁸⁹ Barzani, Masud, (1999) *Barzani o Bzutnawayi Rzgarixwazi Kurd 1932-1945*, Xanie Press and publisher, Duhok, Kurdistan, p133, p152; Wichhart, Stefanie Katharine, (2007) *.intervention British, Egypt and Iraq during World War two*, the University of Texas at Austin, p156.

⁹⁰ McDowall, David, (2004). *A modern history of the Kurds*, New York, the United States, p350.

⁹¹sherwani, Mamakhan (1995). *Barzani o Binchinayi Barzaniyakan*, Stockholm, p150; Muho ,Sadiq Osman, *The role of the foreign factor*, Ibid,p195

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