



Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the United States 1960-1975

Karwan Salih Waisy, Rashila Haj Ramli and Helen Ting Mu Hung
University Kebangsaan Malaysia
marwanguli@gmail.com

Article Info

Received: 04.09.2014
Accepted: 26.11.2014
Published online: 01.12.2014

ISSN: 2231-8968

Abstract

This article is endeavouring to answer the inquiry of the quality of Kurdish leader discernment in predicting, interpreting, likewise replying to U.S Cold War foreign policy during the Kurdish liberation nationalist movement under leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1960s until the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1975. The main objective of this article is forming the geopolitical and personal reason for Kurdish misinterpretation of U.S foreign policy toward them from 1960-1975. Specifically, the decision-making of long time Kurdish nationalist liberation movement leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani will be examine to reveal both personal and wider socio-political interpretations of U.S foreign policy that led Barzani to make up his mind that compromised the livelihoods of the Kurds of Iraq.

Key words: Kurds, the Kurdistan of Iraq, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the U.S.A Cold War foreign policy toward the Kurdish issue and Cold War.

Introduction

The Kurds of Iraq political history can be decrease to a series of assessments made by a few crucial leaders with very few options. The response of those few leaders to direct and indirect U.S foreign policy initiative are preponderant to understanding the trajectory of the Kurdish of Iraq history in the second half of twentieth century. Since the leader of the most powerful Kurdish faction for over half of the twentieth century, Mullah Mustafa Barzani's role in shaping contemporary Kurdish political history was or is indispensable.

Barzani's actions as the long-time leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement leader in Iraq from the 1940s until his death on 11 March of 1979, proved to be of fateful consequence for Kurdish nationalist aspirations and livelihood in Iraq. Explicitly, Barzani's leadership of the early 1970s revolution against the governments of Iraq ended up in calamity for the people of Kurdistan of Iraq especially after the Tragic collapse of Kurdish movement upon the withdrawal of the U.S and the Iranian support following the Iraq-Iran agreement of Algiers in 1975.

After the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1975, Mr. Otis Pike, in the mid-1970s headed the Congressional Special Select Committee on Intelligence, investigated illegal activities of the CIA and the Federal Bureau of investigation (FBI) both internationally and domestically, however the report was never formally published . A media leaked excerpt of the Pike Report estimates that the U.S, "acted with calculated disregard for the fate of the Kurds, hoping to upside from a perpetual cycle of violence in which the Kurds never got their self-government likewise Saddam never gave up wiped them out¹.

There is little debate about the fact that the U.S was more concerned with its diplomatic relations with Iran than the well-being of the Kurds of Iraq in this Cold War context. Certainly, as rapid as Iran that had been shoring up the Kurdish movement as a way to torment the government of Iraq, halted its prop up of the Kurds the U.S followed suit. Definitely, the tragedies of peoples and nations used as Cold War political pawns are sad reality of U.S diplomatic history. The debated and interesting question that remains is that of the quality of Mullah Mustafa Barzani's charismatic leadership given the particular situations of the Kurdish issue in 1960s, and 1970s.

This article is endeavoring to answer the question of the quality of Barzani's Vision in interpreting, responding and predicting, the U.S foreign policy toward the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement from 1960s until the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1975. The main objective of this article is to form the geopolitical and to portrait full picture of Kurdish misinterpretation of U.S foreign policy toward the Kurds from 1960 to 1975. Precisely, the decision-making of long-time leadership of Mullah Mustafa Barzani of Kurdish movement will be illustrated to make known both personal and wider socio-political interpretations of U.S foreign policy led Barzani to make up his mind that compromised the livelihood of the Kurds of Iraq. It states that Barzani's mistakes

A brief overview of Mullah Mustafa Barzani political lifetime

The contemporary political history of the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement in Iraq is long and controversial, as the term “nationalist” has been applied to movements that were, in certainly, offering only independence, self-governing, or advanced stake in financial resourcesⁱⁱ. For instance, Kurdish autonomous monarchy existed as early as the tenth century, and Kurdish tribal leaders endeavoured to gain self-determination under the Ottoman rulers throughout the nineteenth centuryⁱⁱⁱ. In 1929, during the Iraqi Britain Mandate period, Kurdish deputies petitioned the British government for the development of a nominally Kurdish province in Dohuk and other heavily Kurdish-populated areas of Mosul province along with skyrocketed mandate spending in Kurdish areas^{iv}, however it is because of lack of lacked sufficient leadership and organization to plead with the ruling elites (Britain and Iraqi) to act in the interests of Kurdistan people.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani emerged as the most powerful leader in the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement from its formative years until the collapse of the movement in 1975. Mustafa Barzani was born on 3 March 1903 in village called Barzan in the Kurdistan of Iraq, in late 1930s he organized local rebellions in Barzan with his brother, Sheikh Ahmed Barzani. Barzan is countryside in the northern most part of Iraq, right near the point where the border of Iraq, Iran and Turkey meet. Barzani was born into a family of Kurdish rebels who had fought against the Ottoman authorities; further the rebellions naturally resisted Britain control as well, once it became apparent that the Britain did not have any intention of granting Kurdish rights^v.

From his primary indiscretions, Barzani was prisoned with his mother by Ottoman Empire in Mosul city, and then he exiled in early 1940's by the Iraqi government to Hiila in Southern of Iraq, and then imprisoned in Sulaimaniya city in Kurdistan of Iraq, He escape from prison in 1943 to lead a large rebellion in the midst of World War II^{vi}. When his revolt failed Barzani fled to the Kurdistan of Iran with about 3,000 fighters hoping that the Soviet Union (USSR) would follow through an agreement to back the formation of a Kurdish state in Iran, Qazi Muhammad^{vii}, founder of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I)^{viii}, and founder of the Republic of Mahabad^{ix} in 1946, this Republic remains the only declared Kurdish state in history^x. Mulla Mustafa nominated as Minister of defense of the New Republic at the same time

Barzani formed the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)^{xi} in the Kurdistan of Iran in 16 August 1946.

When the USSR withdrew from Iran at the beginning of the Cold War in 1947, the Kurdish Republic collapsed immediately without. Quil Lawrence states that “What undid the Republic of Mahabad at first is not obvious- the internal divisions or the fact that the USSR withdrew their prop up in the spring of 1946 under pressure former allied powers lined up behind the Shah of Iran^{xii}. Fershteh Koochi-Kamali estimates similarly that both the retraction of USSR shore up and Kurdish factionalism contributed to the fall of the Republic^{xiii}.

Following the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Barzani returned back to Iraq, and then escaped to the USSR in 1947, where he remained in exile for the next eleven years with a few hundred of his followers. After the revolution in Iraq in 14 July 1958 and toppling the monarchy regime in Iraq, he congratulated the coup leaders and supported the new regime in Iraq. In 1958, Mustafa Barzani and his fighters returned to Iraq from exile in USSR, and an attempt was made to negotiate a Kurdish autonomy in the north with the new Iraqi regime of Abdul Karim Qasim. The negotiations ultimately failed and the First Kurdish-Iraqi War erupted on 11 September 1961. Although the new Iraqi republic constitution recognized the bi-national (Kurds and Arabs) nature of Iraq. However this new relation didn't go well because of lack of confidence between both sides. The central government armed the Kurdish tribal leaders against Mullah Mustafa Barzani, and bombarded Kurdish areas by planes, killing of civilians and Barzani's followers and destroying hundreds of villages.

During the ongoing conflict which started in 1961, Barzani conducted negotiations with the several Iraqi governments proposing to put an end to the Kurdish movement in exchange for relative autonomy, his first approach was with President Abdul Salam Arif^{xiv} in 1964 and Prime Minister Abdul Al-Rahman Al-Bazzaz^{xv} in 1965^{xvi}. The later declared that the government's intention is to form a “centralized constitutional system” likewise to preserve Iraq's unity. The Kurdish movement continued until mid-1966. In the process, the armed forces of Iraq were debilitated in endeavoring to curb the Kurdish movement. This failure raised many questions concerning the wisdom of depleting the Iraq's resources in a never ending Kurdish-Iraqi warfare. Al-Bazzaz offered a peace agreement program composed of 12 points that met Barzani's requests for self-government^{xvii}. The military elites within the government of Iraq accused Al-Bazzaz of betrayal the constitution. Al-Bazzaz government was ousted right after the agreement

with the Kurdish movement leaders. The Kurdish movement continued with the return of the Baath party to power in 1968^{xviii}. Barzani also endeavoured to gain the international support for Kurdish movement, after they straggled for several years. The Kurdish struggle moved on until 1970 where a series of peace negotiation started between representative of Barzani and the Iraqi government.

Finally, A Kurdish Autonomy agreement was reached by the Iraqi government and Mustafa Barzani and declared on 11 March 1970, for the creation of an Autonomous Region, consisting of the three Kurdish governorates (Arbil, Sulaimanya and Duhok) and other adjacent districts that have been determined by census to have a Kurdish majority. The declaration also gave Kurds representation in central government bodies. The declaration should be implemented in four years.

Second Kurdish–Iraqi War was an offensive, led by Iraqi forces against Kurdish rebels of Mustafa Barzani during 1974-1975. The war came in the aftermath of the 1970 autonomous agreement to be implemented by 1974. The Kurdish autonomy agreement had failed due to mistrust and suspicions among both sides and due to interference of regional (Iran) and international powers (The United States of America). Unlike the previous guerilla campaign, waged by Barzani and his followers , the 1974 war was an attempt for symmetric warfare against the Iraqi Army, which eventually led to the quick collapse of the Kurds after the Alger agreement signed by Shah of Iran and vice-president of Iraq Saddam Hussain in 1975, when the Iraqi government granted half of the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway's to the Iranian government, in return the Iranian government and the United Stets of America withdrew their support to the Kurdish movement in 1975^{xix}.

After the collapse of the Kurdish revolution Barzani fled to Iran and then to the U.S.A for medical treatment, where he died in 1979.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani and the United States 1960-1972

As the dust was lastly settling after the first World War, U.S president Woodrow Wilson endeavored to elicit congressional shore up for his idea of (The Right of Self Determination) for all peoples of the world at the League of Nations in Geneva, including the Kurds as much in the same way he called for “Armenia for Armenians, Arabia for Arabs and Judea for Jew” ... Wilson’s administration viewed the Kurds status as a component piece in the larger political

pawns in the Middle East region. However, his dream has not come to fruition for the Kurdish nation, indeed, up through the late 1960s and early 1970s the U.S did not pay much attention to the Kurdish issue in the region at all. When they did, it was indirect, likewise through the largest lens of the Cold War^{xx}.

In an interview granted to the Kurdish Globe a Greek scholar of Kurdish history Marina Charountaki urges that the Kurds are the first non-state actor to significant influence foreign relations. She goes moreover to illustrate that “usually, scholars see state powers affected by other state powers, but in the case of the Kurds, they see a non-state actor, affect likewise interact with, an international state power. The Kurds of Iraq recently are no longer performers of non-state status... conversely a stable entity recognized as self-government by the constitution of Iraq itself. This alter has not been ignored by U.S cold war foreign policy... so the Kurds of Iraq seemed to have gigantic importance than ever before for the Middle East region balance of power because of their structural role against Saddam’s regime, and their interaction with other major state powers at a foreign policy level^{xxi}.”

Awareness and concern for the Kurdish minority in the Middle East or Near East entered official diplomatic discourse in the U.S.A as early as 1936. In May of that year, the Charge in Iran, Gordon Merriam, wrote to the secretary of State on behalf the Lutheran Mission operating in Iran requesting U.S support in relocating the mission from Kurdistan of Iran to Kurdistan of Iraq. Merriam stated:

“As the policy of the government of Iraq towards the Kurdish issue is both lenient and enlightened, at least by contrast with the severe Kurdish policies of the Iran and Turkish governments. Therefore the presence of the Lutheran mission would be welcomed by government of Iraq^{xxii}.”

This document is evidence of a keen awareness both of the Middle Eastern policies and the existence of Kurdish nationalism in Iran and Iraq. This awareness only grew as geopolitical development after the Second World War brought the situation in Iran and Iraq, as well as the rest of the Middle East to the forefront of the U.S foreign policy during the cold war period.

In September 1962, in an interview with the Now York Time correspondent’s, Dana Adams Schmidt, Mullah Mustafa said:

“Let the Americans give us military assistance and backing us up, openly or secretly, and then we could have truly exercised a self-determination and we will have become your loyal partners in the Middle East region”^{xxiii}.

A Kurdish writer Muhammad Sharif shows in an interview granted to the Kurdish Globe “the Kurdish nationalist movement needed the U.S support and back - up more than the (U.S.A) needed the Kurds; as a result the Kurdish nationalist movement leaders made an effort at pleasing the U.S, which put the Kurdish nationalist movement in an awkward position when it comes to asserting itself and its interest... existing U.S-Kurdish diplomatic relations were now strategic, formal and institutionalized. This is a major shift in U.S Cold War policy... serious internal reform by Kurdish nationalist movement would be welcome in Washington. Externally, well Kurdish nationalist movement diplomatic relations with regional powers would have further warmed up, particularly with the new and upcoming regimes that were replacing the totalitarian regimes of the region, since with these communications comes the potential of the Kurdish nationalist movement plus Iraq turning to be positive democratic model to be replicated”^{xxiv}.

By the mid-1960s, communication between the U.S.A State department and U.S officials in Iraq indicated that the U.S government’s awareness of its disjointed rapport with Kurdish leaders. Although a full-scale war would not begin until they early 1970s, fighting between the Kurdish movement and the government of Iraq was a simmering problem throughout the 1960s. the Department of State frequently had to dispel incorrect interpretations or assumptions about its policy toward Iraq and the Kurds of Iraq, one a telegram from the State Department to its Embassy in Iraq explicitly stated that “there is no truth to the story reported by the Kurds to the Embassy in Cairo that the U.S has promised assistance to the Kurds through third country in event fighting renewed in Iraq”^{xxv}.

On 11 September of 1962, a U.S State Department memorandum on Iraq stated: “the U.S considered the Kurdish issue in Iraq is an internal matter which should be resolved internally. Our (US) government does not shore up Kurdish activities against the government of Iraq in any way likewise wishes an early peaceful resolve will be feasible”^{xxvi}. Besides, any U.S comments on certain Kurdish constitutional wishes would be a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty. Washington was believed that the future of the Kurdish movement was “inseparably tied to the well-being of the countries in which they reside’, which referee to Turkey, Iran Syria and Iraq as well. In the end, Kurdish efforts did not succeed in changing U.S’s policy. The USSR moreover also did not

want to break with the government of Iraq also kept on its supply of USSR arms to the regime. USSR propped up to the KDP only consisted of some minor financial contributions, and there is no evidence to date that the USSR delivered any significant material aid to Barzani and his movement^{xxvii}. However, still there is some disagreement among the experts about whether the U.S clandestinely delivered some sort of shore up to Barzani movement.

A few months later, a telegram from the U.S Embassy in Iraq informed the State Department; that Mullah Mustafa Barzani regards the U.S government as key to settlement of Kurdish issue and the U.S government can get what it wants^{xxviii}. In an addendum to this message to clarify the nature of the lunch with Barzani, Robert Strong claims he informed Barzani that, “the U.S government intends to avoid involving in the specifics of the problem. The Minister commented that he understood our position and he appreciated what I had said. He showed no sign of objection to our role in Kurdish problem. He was friendly and relaxed while I was discussing with him”^{xxix}.

In March 1963, the U.S State Department document demonstrated the official U.S policy guideline for dealing with Iraqi’s new government. The document concluded that if the new regime of Iraq should fail to achieve a swift political resolve to the Kurdish issue, that the only upside would have been the USSR and the communists of Iraq. Conversely, the U.S official position still remained that the Kurdish question should be strictly regarded as an “internal Iraqi issue”. The U.S would have no direct or indirect roll in solving the Kurdish autonomy demand, but did want a peaceful compromise. U.S also had to use its influence on Turkey, Syria and Iran to achieve a similar hands-off policy from their respective governments and objective for friendly Iraqi diplomatic relations in the regions. Since the new regime was anti-USSR, it was expected that the government of Iraq would have allowed a more non-aligned course in addition to thus effectively decrease USSR influence. Therefore, there was no need for the U.S to obtain Iraq advice on how to cope with its domestic communism issue^{xxx}.

Strong, the primary U.S official in Iraq, was communicating his concerns about Barzani’s ideas early in the 1960s, a full decade before the collapse of the Kurdish movement in 1975. Over that decade, Barzani appears not to have altered his conception that the U.S shore up for the Kurds of Iraq was an immutable facet of U.S foreign policy in the Middle East. There is no further evidence that Barzani re-evaluated his feeling or reliance on U.S adopt at the onset of the

Vietnam war a gross oversight recommending Barzani possessed arrogance about the importance of his Kurdish cause to U.S interests that blinded him to geopolitical realities.

The U.S was struggling to maintain its steadfast policy toward the Kurdish issue was made clear in December 1964. At a United Nations General Assembly Meetings in New York on 10th of December, the Iraqi foreign minister Naji Talib^{xxxix} expressed his governments concern towards the Kurdish relations with the Iraqi communists^{xxxix}. He claimed that “if a Kurdish state was established, it would be a communist enclave which would split the Arab world, pierce the protective CENTO belt, and shatter the stability of Turkey and Iran^{xxxix}. The conversation continued:

“Naji Talib had estimated that he did not wish to recommend that the U.S was shoring up the Kurds but he did wish to emphasize that his government is sore-perplexed via reply, the secretary of US categorically assured the minister that the U.S was not directly or indirectly supporting the Kurdish movement. The U.S respects the independence, integrity, also prosperity of Iraq. It had no other interests in Iraqi affairs. Moreover, he shared the minister’s concern about the dangers of communist penetration of the Near East by means of a Kurdish independence movement^{xxxix}”.

Only four days later, on 14th December 1964, in a telegram to the U.S Embassy, the State department expressed feelings against the Kurdish participation in overthrowing the current government of Iraq. The Department of State acknowledged that they were responding to indirect Kurdish inquires as to the position of the U.S on said question. Two days later, on 16th December 1964, the Department of State received a telegram from the Embassy in Iraq. The telegram estimated that Kurdish leaders had informed Embassy officials that the Iranians were prodding the Kurds to create more trouble for the government of Iraq. The telegram outlined what was to be the position conveyed by Embassy officials when they met with Kurdish leaders in the next few days. The strategy read as follows:

“without mentioning any specific plot he will refer to their earlier statements that Iranians attempting to stir up Kurds; he will tell them we think Kurds have wisely resisted Persian blandishments and we wished, they would continue remain calm and endeavour work out solution with the government of Iraq many of whose members favorably disposed towards Kurds; we think Kurds cause will be severely damaged in Iraq if Kurds seemed to act as agents for interest of others^{xxxix}”.

The U.S foreign policy toward Iraq and the Kurds was not without its contradictions. The question arises as to whether the government of Iraq and Mullah Mustafa Barzani chose to believe as stated at the UN summit that the U.S had no interests in Iraq other than Iraqi's success as a nation or that the U.S certainly had a distinct policy of communication with Barzani.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani seemed to have favored the second explanation, sending a message through the Iranian Embassy to the State Department in April 1965 that the U.S ambassador to Iran showed in detail before assuring that the State Department's firm rejection of Barzani's pleas for getting g prop up:

"It was essentially a strong plea for direct assistance. He estimated the Kurds of Iraq need financial and military assistance, especially heavy weapons, and would be willing to receive U.S officials in their area likewise wanted to be regarded as "another state of the Union". Barzani also considered oil resources should be handled via an American firm in direct arrangement with the Kurds of Iraq. We of course gave him no motivate whatsoever"^{xxxvi}.

The issue-of-fact tone of this message does not reflect attempted obscurity or conniving on behalf the ambassador and reflected strong adherence to a United States policy of not encouraging the Kurds to rely on U.S support^{xxxvii}.

The Iraqi governments response concerning the of Iranian aids to the Kurds, Secretary of State Dean Rusk^{xxxviii} sent a telegram in May 1965 to the U.S Embassy in Iraq stating, "As we have often said to Iraqis, we do not control Iranian foreign policy, just as we do not control foreign policies of Turkey, Pakistan, Greece, India, and other Our replied to Kurdish appeals was always the same, we regarded their problem as an internal affairs of Iraq^{xxxix}. In fact this statement which made by the highest ranking official in the State Department of the U.S clearly confirming that the U.S administration. Avoiding any involvement in the Kurdish question in Iraq.

On 11 of August 1965, in a telegram from the State Department to its Embassy in Iran reflects clearly that the U.S is reversing its policy toward the Kurdish question. The telegrams stated:

"The government of Iraq requested for support and efforts to halt flow of arms from Iran to the Kurds of Iraq, this request cannot reasonably be refused. Our consistent policy has been Kurdish insurrection concerning Iraq only and flow of arms and men across border

to bring pressure against the government of Iraq incompatible with our goal to achieve stability in the area. Kurdish victory in Iraq in its pragmatic terms could have only most ominous import for stability if not integrity of Iran and Turkey”^{xi}.

By 1966, U.S policy towards Iraq and its Kurds was primarily built up on attempting to establish an effective Western presence in the country in order to limit USSR influence as much as feasible. Despite the short-lived Baathist government of 1963, the communist presence in Iraq still remained large but this time centered on officials of USSR missions in the country. Conversely, the U.S was concurrently endeavoring to offset USSR influence in the Kurdish areas by maintaining friendly and diplomatic relations with the Kurdish figures; ever since the Kurds of Iraq constituted a considerable share of Iraq’s population and inhabited a strategic part of the country^{xli}.

The U.S administrations likewise pursued policies designed to enhance nationalistic groups in Iraq that wished to avoid too much reliance on the USSR or the pro-Arab nationalists. U.S Kurdish diplomatic relations practically remain limited. The U.S’s concern concentrated strictly on humanitarian issues in their struggle^{xlii}. When the U.S received intelligence information in September 1967 a suggesting feasible resumption of the Kurdish movement, this was seen as particularly hazardous to the already tense circumstance in the Middle East, shortly after June 1967 Six-day Arab-Israel war^{xliii}. Therefore, the U.S was strongly opposed to restarted Kurdish movement and feared the consequence, if Israelis and Iranians support the Kurdish movement, it would turn out to be public. Eventually, the government of Iraq severed its diplomatic relations with U.S due to the Six-day war^{xliv}.

The Kurdish leadership at the time, particularly Barzani, were unable accurately to interpret the U.S policy toward the Kurds in the 1960s, certainly it seemed unfeasible. The U.S foreign policy developments toward the Kurds become more ambiguous in the early 1970s as violence between the government of Iraq and its Kurds adversaries rapidly escalated^{xlv}. However, the U.S ambiguity on the issue made Barzani weary and encouraged his caution in relying upon the U.S on the shore up which seemed mercurial at the best. Moreover, the U.S policy does not appear throughout the 1960s to take Kurdish interests into account at any point. The goal of the Kurds of Iraq (separate from the goals of the Iranian and the government of Iraq) was not in the interests of the U.S officials, it is an obvious fact that have been obvious to

Barzani as well^{xlvi}. In 1972, the U.S Cold War foreign policy toward the Kurdish nationalist liberations movement and its leaders was changed during the president Nixon era^{xlvii}.

The United States foreign policy during the Kurdish movement 1972-1975

Basically, the main interest of the U.S cold War policy regarding the Kurds was, in theory, that the Kurds could be useful in depriving the Qassim^{xlviii} and Communists from power. Still, there were too many strategic reasons for the U.S to refrain from supporting and backing up the Kurdish movement against Baghdad from 1960 to 1972. The United States had two primary objectives. First, if the U.S adopted or supported the Kurdish movement in Iraq, it could also lead the Kurdish separatist activities in Turkey, Iran and Syria demand the same which would affect its regional allies. While the U.S aims were to strengthen a Pro-Western governments, realistic alternatives to Iraqi grimes were unavailable. Thus U.S had to maintain friendly diplomatic relations with the governments of Iraq; consequently USSR influence could be balanced. As a result, the U.S maintained a strict position of non-Involvement in the Kurdish movement. The U.S even feared that a Kurdish movement could drive Qassim and Arifs administrations closer to the USSR administration; therefore U.S shore up the Kurdish movement was very unlikely^{xlix}.

However, The U.S.A president Nixon initially aided the Kurds in the early 1970s against the second Baath government under Ahmed Hassan Baker, the U.S viewed the Kurds in the larger context of the seemingly perpetual Cold War between the U.S and the USSR as well as the close diplomatic relations that the U.S had with the Shah of Iran. At the time, the U.S and the Shah backed up the Kurdish nationalist liberation against the nascent pan-Arab fascist and pseudo socialist regime in Iraq. Nonetheless, subsequent to both Iran and Iraq forming political understanding among each other only a few years later, what is more following the Shah's lead, the U.S disregarded Kurdish appeals for propping up in seeking self-sufficient in Kurdish areas^l.

The U.S Clod War foreign policy toward the Kurds of Iraq during Kurdish movement 1972 -975 was primarily dictated via U.S policy toward Iran. The U.S –Iraq diplomatic relations had been severed since 1967, furthermore Iraq and Iran formally severed their diplomatic relations on 30 November 1971, as a consequence of the conflict over the Shatt-al-Arab Waterway. Since its relations with British had moreover fallen through, Iraq was relying solely on the support of the USSR and other communist countries in the early 1970s. By the fall of 1971, U.S began to increase its military support to the shah of Iran^{li}.

Whether or not the U.S actually feared the development of Iraq's relations with the communists plus the USSR is still unclear. The government in Baghdad had definitely been courting USSR oil interests for some time, several deals made in 1969 granted USSR access to oil-fields in Iraq, particularly in the North Rumaila fields. The USSR-Iraq friendship treaty of 7 April 1972, essentially a weapons deal combined with the government's nationalization of the Iraqi Petroleum Company later the summer, positively would have caused the U.S to be weary of the possible consequences of Iraq's relationship with the USSR^{lii}.

Conversely, Farouk-Sluglett make a compelling argument that a combination of reasons motivated U.S interests in the conflict, especially, its support of Iran, "Iraq's pro-USSR stance, its apparently uncompromising foreign policy pronouncements and the threats it appeared to be posing to the stability of the Gulf area, had combined to arouse intense concern on the part of the U.S and Iran^{liii}. Quil Lawrence states to this argument the claim that the U.S viewed Iran as its "anchor" in the Middle East region likewise so felt compelled to prop up the country in its conflict with Iraq^{liv}.

To complicate issues, discussions in congress about the U.S aid to the Kurds recommended that the U.S government was avoiding an official policy toward the Kurds also was, instead framing its foreign policy specifically toward Iran. On 6 November 1974, Representative Lee Hamilton from Indiana, breached the issue of direct U.S policy toward the Iraqi Kurds. Hamilton, who had currently met with Kurdish movement representatives, told the Congress: "While I believe that the question of any aid, overt or covert, to the Kurdish revolution is absolutely out of the question, I regret the unwillingness of senior official of the State Department to meet informally with two former Iraqi ministers who are also members of the KDP^{lv}. The text both of Hamilton's initial request to the Committee of Foreign Affairs and its respond were likewise included in the Congressional Record, further they reply from the subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia states:

"We have received several request from the Kurdish movement representatives for meetings, last year, the contacts with the Kurdish representatives have been limited to the country officer or country director's level. To alter this policy at this time could well be subject to misinterpretation by both the Kurds and the government of Iraq in Baghdad. We have estimated as a consequence of our policy, a fall-off Iraqi National Agency (INA), Iraqi allegations that the U.S was propping up the Kurdish movement,... we did

not wish to motivate the Kurds to believe that we were prepared to shore up overtly or covertly, their movement in Iraq”^{lvi}.

The language of the Chairman of the Subcommittee recommended a keen awareness of the possibility of Kurdish misinterpretation of U.S policy. The statement further reflects a substantial effort on behalf of the Department of State to maintain a consistent policy toward the Kurds in order to avoid moreover misinterpretation of U.S goals.

From 1972-1975, the Iranian government funneled money and weapons to the Kurds of Iraq. The Kurds received this material support from Iran in return for weakening the regime in Baghdad by fomenting unrest. Iran also pledged its support of the Kurds against the government of Iraq^{lvii}. When the Shah reached an agreement with Saddam Hussein at Algiers in 1975, the result of secret negotiations to which the Kurds were not privy, the conflict was settled moreover Iran and U.S immediately halted its supporting the Kurds. The government in Baghdad was free to discipline the rebellions Kurdish minority as it was fit.

There is some discussion among the experts about the U.S deliberately sold out the Kurds and their movement or whether they had no choice in ending up their propping up. The primary arguments was Washington abandoned Barzani without warning, neglected desperate Kurdish pleas for shoring up, additionally failed to deliver humanitarian aid after the Kurdish movement was put down^{lviii}. The leading reporter of this viewpoint was Representative Otis Pike, who was the chairman of the White House Intelligent Select Committee, a congressional investigation into CIA operations and their costs. Leaking to the press of the conclusions from the so-called Pike Report in February 1976 eventually revealed the details of the Kurdish movement^{lix}.

The Pike Committee, documents recommended that the Project was initially as a favor to U.S ally Iran. U.S shored up could what is more be seen as “largely symbol”, due to Iran’s propped up was significantly gigantic. Conversely, it was furthermore concluded that “the U.S acted in effect as a guarantor that he insurgent group would not be summarily dropped via the foreign head of state”^{lx}. Still, the U.S was unable to prevent the Shah from abruptly cutting off his shore up to the Kurdish movement. The Pike Committee reasoned that if the U.S had not propped up Iran’s prodding of the Kurds of Iraq, eventually the insurgents may have reached an agreement with the central government over some form of self-government. Additionally, the high amount of secrecy encompassing the operation was due to the Department of State, strongly opposed to such interference in the region, was not reckoned to be informed^{lxi}. On the “no win,

no lose” approach of U.S Cold War policy the Pike Report said: “Even in the context of covert action, ours (U.S) a cynical enterprise”. The Pike Committee also acknowledged that owing to all U.S shored up was channeled through Iran; direct assistance to the Kurdish movement would have been unthinkable without Iranian logistical aid. Therefore, the Pike Report maintained that when Iran reached an agreement with the government of Iraq and suppressed their own shore up for the Kurds, the U.S had no choice but to acquiesce^{lxii}.

The consequences for the Kurds were severing. Saddam Hussein pursued a harsh policy of ethnic cleansing in the Kurdistan of Iraq. Within three years of truce with Iran, over 1,000 villages had been razed to create an 18-mile deep buffer zone along Kurdistan’s external borders. Entering the zone prompted immediate execution. about 100,000 escaped across the border to Iran (the Shah accept Barzani and these supporters as refugees), other surrendered to the government in Baghdad, and others unwilling or unable to take advantage of these two options, committed suicide^{lxiii}. Later, Kurds who returned to Iraq under the promise of amnesty were deported to desert camps in Southern Iraq^{lxiv}.

Saddam Hussein, intent on ensuring that the Kurdish factions would no longer pose a threat to his regime, immediately he cut of hundreds of villages and towns from Kirkuk province and annexed it to other provinces accordingly, two new provinces had been established namely: Tamim and Salahudin. This geographical reorientation meant that the Kurds would no longer enjoy an ethnic majority in either province, dashing the Kurds hopes for collective political action in the foreseeable future^{lxv}.

Mustafa Barzani’s understandings of U.S foreign policy

The U.S directly supported Iran throughout the conflict and was thus indirectly shore up the Kurds of Iraq. Barzani began making appeals to Washington-DC for aid in 1972, likewise he made it publicly obvious that he was depend on prop up from the U.S, telling the Washington post in 1973, “we do not trust the Shah, I trust U.S. U.S is too great a power to betray a small people like the Kurds^{lxvi}”. “Despite his public statements of reliance on the U.S, Barzani upheld the covert nature of U.S aid as per Cold War protocol at the time, plus his appeals were always sent by way of Israel or king Hussein of Jordan^{lxvii}”.

The memories of U.S decision makers at the time tell a different story. Quil Lawrence shows that, “Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s deputy at that time, remembers U.S shore up for the

Kurdish movement as strictly an appendage of U.S-Iran policy. “The Kurds were derivative. The Shah was a good ally. Furthermore, he was having problem with Iraq. We were emotionally shoring up the Kurds, however, it was not a big deal, said Scowcroft”^{lxviii}. Based on Scowcroft’s interpretation of events, the fact is not propping up that the U.S halted for the Kurds of Iraq when Iran made the decision to do so. Lawrence states that while Kurdistan viewed U.S involvement as a guarantee that Iran would not pull rug out, that Barzani, with his political and Cold War experience, “should have seen the low coming”^{lxix}.

When Mullah Mustafa Barzani was in Washington in 1973, he reportedly said to Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post’s reporter somewhat in jet, “we could turn to be your 51st state in addition to provide you with sufficient oil revenue”. Conversely, the U.S had no long term plans to engage with KNLM in Iraq. Nixon’s then National Security Advisor (NSA) afterward Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously replied to Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s personal letter inquiring for shoring up, “covert action should not have been confusing with missionary work”^{lxx}.

When Saddam had offered Barzani a cease-fire or self-sufficiency on 11 March 1974, an endeavor to win the war on Saddam’s terms, Barzani declined the offer and instead sent Washington a “pipe-dream request” for greatly increased U.S aid^{lxxi}. Years later, Barzani’s son would insist his father believed the U.S would honor their commitment to the Kurdish movement^{lxxii}.

Was Barzani to blame for Kurdish suffering following the collapse of the 1975 movement? some experts as evidence Hussein Tahiri and Bryan Robert Gibson states that “Barzani is to blame for not realizing that once Iran and the U.S had reached their own objectives that they would propping up the Kurdish movement. he goes on to accuse Barzani’s shores up of being “overoptimistic”^{lxxiii} owing to their prop up from the U.S and Iran recommending that without U.S adopt , which Barzani considered crucial to any Kurdish victory, Barzani may have been willing to approve Saddam’s 1974 self-determination law. There was likewise evidence that Barzani disregarded and kept from his compatriots a mid-1973 warning to create border concessions to Iran so to end the Kurdish movement^{lxxiv}. The consequence of this study, performed by the Kurdish movement preparatory committee which had broken away from Barzani in 1975, could, however, recommended offers via the Preparatory Committee to distance itself from Barzani’s defeat. If true, however, the study is evidence of Barzani’s awareness of the

possibility of an imminent border agreement Iran and Iraq that would leave the Kurds without recourse^{lxxv}.

The question then arises as to how Barzani perceived U.S prop up in the early 1970s and if he was aware of any contingencies attached to the prop up. Barzani obviously overestimated the U.S conception of Iraq as a communist threat. In 1962, Barzani ominously told Dana Adams Schmidt correspondent of the New York Times that, “without U.S aid, the Kurdish movement would be pushed towards communism”^{lxxvi}. Taken together, Barzani’s failures to accurately interpret U.S foreign policy spelled defeat as early as the 1960s, and Barzani never course.

Conclusion

From the early 1960s, Mullah Mustafa Barzani had reason to reevaluate his relationship with the U.S however failed to do so. But after 1972 he attempted his efforts to build a reliable diplomatic relations with the US and Iran.

After the collapse of the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement in Iraq in 1975; its leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani had fled to Iran and then to the U.S.A. The physician’s consultant discovered that he was suffering from lung cancer, The Kurdish movement representatives in the U.S capital Washington persuaded him to get treatment in the U.S. when Mullah Mustafa Barzani obtained messages in his sickbed from Kurdish leaders in Iraq proposing unification of Kurdish factions, and he rejected their ideas totally. Hence, he was the supreme leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement he had a clear vision for the future of the Kurdish issue in Iraq and he was afraid of anther set back to the Kurdish issue and may be it will lead to another dividing between the Kurdish political leaders for political ambitions . Mustafa Barzani was still suffering from consequences of the abandonment of the Kurdish question by the United States of America and Iran.

The reliance of the Kurdish leadership on the foreign powers, factionalism within the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement, and the lack of a political experience of some leaders, enmity between Kurdish tribes and Mullah Mustafa, as well as the autocratic manner of the Kurdish leadership, all that undermined the strength of the Kurdish revolution in Iraq. All above mention facts – inter ilia – of other reasons played a significant troll in the collapsing of the Kurdish movement in 1975.

In addition to the above mentioned internal affairs, the researcher believe that the reliance of Barzani and some of political leaders on foreign powers and its Cold War policies was the

main reason behind collapsing of the Kurdish movement in 1975 not the Kurdish fighters responsibility.

The conclusion of this article concurs with the findings of Sarah Marif and Karim Yaildiz on the fact that Mustafa Barzani's audacity, which was, probably a part product of his inexperience led to grave results on the Kurdish people as a whole.

Mustafa Barzani was so convinced of the essentialness of U.S support and he never stopped reconsidering his options, for instance accepting a truce and negotiate with Saddam in 1970. The stand of U.S was not clear in that time and no details were available at the time, Meanwhile, Mustafa Barzani acted as if he had U.S prop up only to be let down when this proved a false reality.

This article estimates that regardless of any still classified or destroyed documents which contains the detail negotiations between Mustafa Barzani and various U.S officials particularly (the State Department and CIA.), the nature of U.S foreign policy as presented in the preceding evidence should have been enough for Mustafa Barzani to conclude that the U.S had no intention of unconditionally supporting the Kurds issue in Iraq.

The U.S Cold War foreign policy of using the ethnic minorities in the Middle East as part of its Cold War political pawns which definitely an embarrassing facet of U.S diplomatic history in the region and other part of the World.

Mullah Mustafa Barzani's dragging on to rely on the U.S prop up given the available evidence as to the risk of this method namely relying on the foreign powers is a costly setback in the road to Kurdish self-determination and wellbeing of the Kurdish people.

* Karwan Salih Waisy is a master's degree student at the Institute of Malaysian and international studies (IKMAS) at the national university of Malaysia

* Rashila Haj Ramli is a professor of political sciences at the National University of Malaysia. She is the director of the Institute of Malaysian and international studies.

* Helen Ting Mu Hung is holding a doctoral of political sciences. She is a fellow at the Institute of Malaysian and international studies at the National University of Malaysia

References

-
- ⁱ Quil Lawrence.2008. Invisible nation: How the Kurd's quest for statehood is shaping Iraq and the Middle East, Walker& company, New York, U.S, P28.
- ⁱⁱ Charles Tripp. 2007. A history of Iraq, Cambridge University press: Cambridge, the U.S, p64.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Hussein Tahiri.2007, The structure of Kurdish society and the Struggle for a Kurdish state, Mazda Publisher: Cosa Mesa, California, U.S, p114.
- ^{iv} Charles Tripp. 2007. Ibid, p64.
- ^v Sarah Marif Caruana.2010. The legacy of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Bachelor of Arts in history, the University of Georgia, Athens, p12.
- ^{vi} Karim Yalidiz.2007, the Kurds of Iraq: past, present and future, Pluto press: London, the U.K, P16.
- ^{vii} Qazi Muhammad was one of the religious Kurdish leaders in the Kurdistan of Iran, he formed the Kurdistan Democratic party of Iran, he also established the Kurdistan Republic in 1946, and the Iranian government punished him in 1947.
- ^{viii} The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I) was formed by Qazi Muhammad in the Iranian Kurdistan. The KDP-I is still doing political activities in the Kurdistan of Iran.
- ^{ix} The Republic of Mahabad was formed in 1946 by Qazi Muhammad with the support of the USSR, but by the end of 1946 collapsed by the government of Iran.
- ^x Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p17.
- ^{xi} The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was found in 1946 in the Iranian Kurdistan. The KDP leaders led the Kurdish revolution from 1961-1975. The KDP was or is one of the most active Kurdish political party in the Kurdistan region presently.
- ^{xii} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p17.
- ^{xiii} Freshth Kooohi Kamali.2003. The Political development of the Kurds in Iran pastoral nationalism, Palgrave Macmillan publisher, New York, the U.S, p179.
- ^{xiv} Abdul Salam Arif became the president of Iraq after the deploying the regime of Qassim in 1963, he died in plane crash in 1966.
- ^{xv} Abdul Al-Rahman Al-Bazzaz was the prime minister of Iraq during the first Baathist government, but pan-Arab nationalist pressure him to give up his position and then he gave it up.
- ^{xvi} David McDowall, 2004. A modern history of the Kurds, Now York, the U.S, p323.
- ^{xvii} Jr. Donald Bruce Disney. 1980. The Kurdish nationalist movement and external influence, the degree of master, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, the U.S, p212.
- ^{xviii} David McDowall, 2004, Ibid, p325.

- ^{xix} Rashid Khalidi.2009.Sowing Crisis the Cold War and American Dominate in the Middle East, Boston press, Massachusetts, the U.S, p31.
- ^{xx} Benjamin Kweskin. Fall 2011. A new special relationship? U.S-Iraqi Kurdish relations from 1991-2011, U.S, P2.
- ^{xxi} Wriya Rehmany.19December2010. America's Iraqi policy relies heavily on KRG stability in the North of Iraq, Interview with Marina Charountaki, the Kurdish Globe Newspaper No (285), Erbil, Kurdistan, p14.
- ^{xxii} Lokman Meho.2009. The Kurdish question in U.S foreign policy: A documentary Sourcebook, translated to Kurdish by: Wriya Rahmani, first edition, East Publisher: Erbil, Kurdistan, p410.
- ^{xxiii} Dana Adams Schmidt. 2008. A trip among Brave men in Kurdistan, translated to Kurdish by: Abu Bakr Salih Ismail, Erbil, Kurdistan, p78.
- ^{xxiv} Muhammad M. Saleh. Saturday 25June2011. Interview with Muhammad Sharif: U.S foreign policy and the Kurds: the evaluation of U.S Kurdish relations, the Kurdish Globe, No (310), Erbil, Kurdistan, p13; Benjamin Kweskin. Fall 2011, Ibid, p17; Benjamin Kweskin. Fall 2011, Ibid, p17.
- ^{xxv} Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p457.
- ^{xxvi} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014. U.S foreign policy on the Kurds of Iraq, bachelor degree, the university of Leiden, Netherlands,p12
- ^{xxvii} Ibid.
- ^{xxviii} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010. pid, p21;Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p258.
- ^{xxix} Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p459.
- ^{xxx} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014, Ibid, p19.
- ^{xxxi} Najji Talib was one of the stronger Pan-Arab nationalist in Iraq, he became the minister of foreign affairs of Iraq during the regime of Abdul Salam Arif.
- ^{xxxii} Bryan Robert Gibson.2013. U.S Foreign Policy, Iraq and the Cold War 1958-1975, the degree of Doctor philosophy, the London School of Economics and Political sciences, the U.K, P146;Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p22;Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p458.
- ^{xxxiii} Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p144; Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p460.
- ^{xxxiv} Ibid; Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p22; Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p461.
- ^{xxxv} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p22; Lokman Meho.2009, pid, p4461.
- ^{xxxvi} Ibid; Ibid
- ^{xxxvii} Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p145; Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p23.
- ^{xxxviii} Dean Rusk was the U.S Secretary of State from 1961 to 1969 under presidents John. F. Kennedy and Lyndon ,
- ^{xxxix} Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p463; Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p23.
- ^{xl} Ibid, p463.
- ^{xli} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014, Ibid, p129.
- ^{xlii} Ibid, p29; Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p464.
- ^{xliiii} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014, Ibid, p29.
- ^{xliiv} Ibid, p30.
- ^{xlv} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p25.
- ^{xlvi} Ibid
- ^{xlvii} Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p216.
- ^{xlviii} Abdul Karim Qassim became the prime minster of Iraq after deploying the monarchy of Iraq in 1958. Abdul Salam Arif the leader of the first Baathist coup killed him in 1963.
- ^{xlix} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014, Ibid, p59.
- ^l Benjamin Kweskin. Fall 2011, Ibid, p3.
- ^{li} Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett.1989, Ibid, p144; Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p26.
- ^{lii} Ibid, p147; Ibid, p26.
- ^{liii} Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett.1989, Ibid, 159.
- ^{liv} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p25.
- ^{lv} Lokman Meho.2009, Ibid, p4640.
- ^{lvi} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p27.
- ^{lvii} Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett.1989, Ibid, p151.
- ^{lviii} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014,Ibid,p48; Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p235

- ^{lix} Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p235.
^{lx} Algemene Geschiedenis. 2014, Ibid, p48.
^{lxi} Ibid
^{lxii} Ibid
^{lxiii} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p30.
^{lxiv} Hussein Tahiri.2007, Ibid, p114.
^{lxv} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p31.
^{lxvi} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010.pid, p31.
^{lxvii} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p25.
^{lxviii} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p31
^{lxix} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p25.
^{lxx} Benjamin Kweskin. Fall 2011, Ibid, p3.
^{lxxi} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p31.
^{lxxii} Quil Lawrence.2008, Ibid, p29.
^{lxxiii} Hussein Tahiri.2007, Ibid, p115; Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p236.
^{lxxiv} Sarah Marif Caruana.2010, Ibid, p31.
^{lxxv} Ibid, p32.
^{lxxvi} Dana Adams Schmidt. 2008, Ibid, p98; Bryan Robert Gibson.2013, Ibid, p136; Hussein Tahiri.2007, Ibid, p115.